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session. I shall be glad to join with the Senator in that effort.

Mr. OVERTON. I thank the Senator.
INTERNATIONAL PEACE MACHINERY—
THE DUMBARTON OAKS CONFERENCE

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, on yesterday there convened at Washington, at Dumbarton Oaks, a notable international conference. Representatives of the United States, Russia, and Great Britain have met in what may be called exploratory conversations respecting the structure of international peace machinery to effect what we hope will affect all the nations of the earth, the great nations as well as the small ones.

Mr. President, it is somewhat difficult to realize the tremendous significance of such a meeting. Personally, I think we stand at the crossroads. I think the outcome of this conference will mean either that we shall go forward in the establishment of peace machinery or that we shall miserably fail in one of the greatest undertakings with which the Nation has ever been confronted.

The story of the efforts of the United States toward world peace afford an interesting background of what is now presented. Recently I have been reading about the establishment of what was known as the League to Enforce Peace, which antedated the World War. Some of the most notable men in the United States took part in the establishment of that organization. It did a great deal toward crystallizing public sentiment and stimulating thought along the lines of what was called an enforced peace.

I shall not dwell upon the transactions of 1919 and 1920. I believe that all the world has now come to the conclusion that unless we are to look forward in the next generation to another world war, brought on by ambition, resentment, anger, and hatred, perhaps on the part of those who may be conquered in the pending war—unless we wish to look forward to that kind of eventuality it behooves the people of the United States and of all the world, for that matter, wholeheartedly to join in the effort to create, establish, and maintain international peace machinery.

Mr. President, we cannot, of course, hope to create an agency which will be pleasing to everyone in all its details. Some will take exception to this, that, or the other. That would not be unnatural. When the Constitution of the United States was established there was disagreement over some of its provisions. There were notable contests in the conventions of several States over the ratification or nonratification of the product of the Convention of 1787. I recall that in the Virginia convention great figures like Patrick Henry, George Mason, and others resisted ratification, and it was finally achieved by a margin of only 10 votes. The same situation prevailed in the conventions of some of the other States.

So, Mr. President, as we approach the work of the present conference which, in the course of due time, will be followed by another conference on a higher level, I hope the people of the United States, and particularly Members of the Senate

and of the House of Representatives, will work together in peace and in unity, looking forward to the larger concept of the organization.

As chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations I wish to pay my sincere tribute to the Republican members of the committee for their approach to the present problem. There was no evidence of partisanship in the work which they have done. There was no evidence of pettifoggery. There was no disposition to inject matters of factional or partisan consideration.

The subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations was composed of the chairman, the Senator from Georgia [Mr. George], the Senator from Utah [Mr. Thomas], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. BARKLEY], the Senator from Iowa (Mr. Gillette), the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. La Follette], the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG], and the Senator from Maine [Mr. WHITE]. I am deeply grateful to each member for their patriotic and arduous labors in conference with the Secretary of State and in committee. I particularly wish to express my sense of gratitude to the Senators who represented the minority on the subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations. For approximately 6 months they labored in framing and presenting to the Senate the resolution which was adopted by the Senate on November 5, 1943. Irrespective of party affiliations, that resolution has met with widespread approval throughout the United States. It does not, of course, undertake to go into all the details, activities, and aspects of the proposed organization, but in a large way it lays before the people of the United States and of the world the basic structure and considerations which such an organization should embrace.

I wish also to pay my respects to those Republicans who in the Mackinac resolution at an early date labored well and handsomely toward creating what, according to their minds, was a workable and satisfactory structure of a peace organization.

Mr. President, I wish also to express my deep sense of gratitude to the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. La Follette], the Senator from Michigan [Mr. Vandenserg], and the minority leader, the Senator from Maine [Mr. White.] They were members of the subcommittee to which I have made reference, and they labored long and arduously. The Senator from Vermont [Mr. Austin] also participated in conferences with the Secretary of State. He is now a useful member of the committee.

In addition to the work which was performed in the Committee on Foreign Relations and in the subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, almost weekly during a period of nearly a year we consulted with the Secretary of State in regard to the approaching difficulties which were to be presented. In all those conferences there was no partisanship; there was no effort to obtain a partisan advantage; and there was no effort to waylay and attack from the flank anything which we were undertaking to do.

So, Mr. President, I hope that the spirit which I have attempted to describe may continue. I am sure that it will continue.

I wish to express my sense of appreciation to the authors of the original socalled B.H. resolution, Senate Resolution 114. I wish particularly to pay my sincere appreciation to those Senators because I realize their sincerity and their earnestness. While the subcommittee did not wholly agree with the resolution in its essential details, it did agree with the great objective which the sponsors of the resolution had in mind. There was no difference in the ambition of any of us to bring about one great concrete result, namely, the creation of an instrumentality by which questions could be tested not by swords and cannon, but by logic and reason. In the event a decision were to be made that there must be no aggression by those who would seek by force of arms and might to overrun their peaceful neighbors, it was intended that an organization should be created which would have sufficient power and force to prevent the conditions against which we were inveighing.

I believe that by now practically all elements of our people have arrived at the opinion that an international organization must be endowed with a sufficient armed force—naval and military—to prevent the occurrences which have resulted in this terrible and tragic war.

Mr. President, the three great countries which, through their representatives, are now holding conferences have. of course, been in conference over a considerable period of time by personal contact as well as by correspondence. It is very gratifying to witness the fine spirit which seems to actuate them at the present moment. A little later representatives of China will be called into conference. After the preliminary conversations shall have come to an end a conference on a higher level will be convened, and in due time representatives of all the people of the nations of the world, however small their territories may be, however weak their arms may be, will be called into conference in order that the small nations shall have a voice and a representation in the peace machinery. After all, Mr. President, the small and weak nations are the ones which will receive the greatest benefits from such an organization as the one being proposed. As a rule they are more often attacked by the more powerful, the more aggressive, and those who are ambitious to achieve military mastery, than are the great and strong powers.

Mr. President, in the liquidation of this war after it shall have come to an end it will not be practicable immediately to conclude a treaty of peace. Pending a definite treaty of peace it may be necessary for the four great powers participating on the Allied side to maintain contact and concert of action in bringing about control and supervision in enemy countries. We cannot permit chaos and anarchy to break out in any of the countries which have been overrun and occupied. We cannot permit those conditions to obtain even in the enemy countries. So far as the war itself is concerned the great powers must continue

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to act in harmony. It does not follow, however, as a result that the permanent peace structure which we hope to set up will in any way be modified.

Mr. President, I am sure that Secretary Hull and those associated with him in this enterprise welcome conferences with any one who has a thought to suggest and who will come to them in a spirit of helpfulness and cooperation. I am sure that that is their attitude. It is the attitude of our Committee on Foreign Relations and its subcommittee. We want suggestions from any source, provided they come in a spirit of helpfulness and not in one of enmity and a determination to obstruct the processes of the conference.

So the prospects of the conference's successful outcome are very propitious, indeed. There seems to prevail a spirit of cooperation, of good will, and a desire to unite in the creation of the peace structure.

Mr. President, I do not think, however, that our people should be led to the conclusion that this war is already over, because it is not. While reports from the battlefields of Europe have been very impressive and inspiring, while they have offered much hope of an early termination of the war, we cannot afford to relax one inch; we cannot let anything cause us to recede from the aggressive militant spirit that will be required to win this war. We hope in due course, however, to establish an agency which will offer hope to the peoples of the earth, which will offer hope to the small and the weak nations, which will offer hope to the nations who entertain peaceful ambitions, and will offer condemnation to nations that entertain visions of conquest of their neighbors or the overrunning of the world and the establishment of military monarchies.

Mr. President, will the Mr. TAFT. Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield to the Sena-

tor from Ohio.
Mr. TAFT. The Senator is chairman of a committee of the House and Senate, I think, which has been conferring with Secretary Hull regarding the general character of the post-war peace organization?

Mr. CONNALLY. I will say to the Senator that I am not chairman of the joint committee. I am chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, but groups from both House and the Senate for over a considerable period have

conferred with Secretary Hull.

Mr. TAFT. I was only interested to know whether that committee is sitting in on the Dumbarton Oaks Conference or whether they are keeping in touch with it or keeping advised of it, or what the status is. What is the relation of the committee created by Congress with the present Dumbarton Oaks Conference?

Mr. CONNALLY. The present conference does not include members of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate or of the House of Representatives. The present group is more of a meeting of technicians concerned with the physical integration of what the larger policy that is indicated to them might be. However, I shall say to the

Senator from Ohio that I have had up with the Secretary of State the matter of our being kept informed, and I have assurances that daily, if necessary, and from time to time the Committee on Foreign Relations will be kept advised of the progress of these negotiations and of any matter of sufficient importance to attract the attention of the committee. Does that answer the Senator?

Mr. TAFT. Yes. In a way, then, the committee is on a higher level than those who are conferring; and when the conference reaches a higher level, then the committee of the Senate will participate.

Mr. CONNALLY. I do not know that that is true. The Senator is aware of the fact, of course, that in the United States the custom has always been for the Executive to handle the negotiations and that the matters were simply submitted to the Senate at a later time. I wish to say to the Senator that Mr. Hull and his associates have not taken that position. They have evidenced a desire to have the cooperation of and to cooperate with the Senate, and while we perhaps may not be members even of the higher level, it might overbalance the representation from other countries if that happened—we will be kept advised; we will have access to the Secretary of State, and, if necessary, to other func-tionaries connected with the matter. I have no fear that there will be any sort of ignoring of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Mr. VANDENBERG. Mr. President, may I say a word at that point?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield to the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. VANDENBERG. I think I owe it to the Secretary of State to add at this point that he personally communicated with me, representing the minority group of the special committee, and personally placed at my disposal any information I may seek at any time regarding any phase of the Dumbarton Oaks conference.

Mr. CONNALLY. I shall say to the Senator from Ohio supplementing what the Senator from Michigan has said, that he called the subcommittee into conference and handed each one of its members a complete draft of what was in his mind as to the general structure of the peace organization. It was confidential; it was not given to the public; but I simply cite that fact to show the evidence of entire willingness to keep the Senate advised and to take us into confidence.

Mr. TAFT. I was only interested in determining what the exact status was.

While I am on my feet, however, I should like to ask the Senator one other question. I was somewhat alarmed to read in the New York Times of Friday, August 18, what purports to be an interview with our Ambassador, Mr. W. Averell Harriman. There he is cited by a Polish newspaper in regard to a conference held with the Polish committee which was set up under the auspices of the Russian Government. I quote from the article:

It cites Mr. Harriman's declaration to the Polish National Council's representatives that

the "alliance between the United States of America and the United Soviet Socialist Republics is firm and is expected to endure for decades.'

I wonder if the Senator could tell me whether there is any such alliance or whether that is a misquotation of the Ambassador's statement.

Mr. CONNALLY. I think that is a rhetorical flourish on the part of the Ambassador.

The Senator thinks there Mr. TAFT. is no alliance?

Mr. CONNALLY. There is no alliance in the sense of any treaty or any binding commitment. I think what he means there is that as a result of this war our relations have been drawn much more closely together and that the unity and harmony to wind up the war and to liquidate it will probably be extended to the future.

Mr. TAFT. The Senator feels confident that there is no alliance of any kind, secret or otherwise?

Mr. CONNALLY. We have the assurance from the highest possible sources that there were no commitments whatever made at Moscow, Teheran, Cairo, or Casablanca that will be binding on this Government.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a moment?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. HATCH. I have been very much interested in what the Senator has had to say with regard to the relations of the Secretary of State with the committees of Congress on this all-important and vital subject because I think that relationship itself may well spell the success or failure of any plan; and, from what I have heard said here, I take it that the attitude of the Secretary of State is not one of ignoring the Congress, but, on the other hand, there may be said to be a sincere attitude of complete cooperation with the appropriate committees of the Congress. Is that correct?

Mr. CONNALLY. I think the Senator has stated it accurately.

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Does the Senator from Texas yield to the Senator from Florida?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield. Mr. PEPPER. I have been one of those who have heard from time to time with great interest and appreciation the statements which have been made on the floor by the able chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee [Mr. Con-NALLY), and I have heard with approval his generous references to the attitude of Senators on the other side of the aisle. However, the inquiry which was made a moment ago by the able Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT] and the history of this body in respect to international agreements leads one to be concerned as to whether or not before we come to the point of decision on these matters we have perfected the machinery and the technique by which we propose to meet them and to handle them. It seems to me that if there is ever going to be any question raised at a subsequent time about whether the Senate has had adequate participation in these matters, the time to raise the question is now before the deliberations proceed too far.

If, as the elder Senator Lodge ably maintained, the right of the Senate to advise includes the power and the right of the Senate to suggest and to take part in the initial deliberations and discussions, if I understand his theory correctly, and if it is a tenable theory, let us determine it before we ever have the conference and not wait until the delegates depart for their several countries and then insist that the Senate was not adequately represented. Let us determine our course and our theory and the theory of our rights and our duty, and let us advise the executive branch of the Government that we regard our power as a coordinate power not only in the ratification of these international understandings, but in their negotiation, and, having been left out of the negotiation, we feel we have been precluded from our correct and proper part.

In the second place, Mr. President, would it not be wise, if I may venture the suggestion, that the joint committee, which has been well-functioning, work out some proper way of limiting the time in committee and debate on the floor which shall be devoted to these matters, so that we can assure other powers that, within a reasonable time at least, the United States of America shall make a decision one way or the other about the

matter.

I think the able chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Senators on both sides of the aisle would have to agree that as it is, at the present time, neither the President nor the Secretary of State can tell any foreign power or powers when the decision of the United States Government, including the action of the Senate under its power. may be expected upon an international agreement. We certainly should perfect a formula or come to some agreement respecting machinery under which action can be taken, so that no nation or group of nations will have to wait indefinitely upon the action of this branch of the Government as being necessary to the validating of agreements.

The third thing, Mr. President—and the able chairman has been most indulgent, as he always is—if there is going to be a protracted debate upon whether these agreements constitute agreements to be ratified by the Senate and the House of Representatives by majority vote, as opposed to treaties which require two-thirds vote in the Senate, can we not jointly and in a spirit of patriotism and cooperation formulate some standard, some definition, which might establish the line of demarcation between an agreement and a treaty?

Senators well know that there is an agreement now pending in the Foreign Relations Committee, the oil agreement with Great Britain, and Senators know that we shall soon be presented with the report of the monetary conference, but which has not yet come to the committee. They are matters of great importance, and there may be differences of opinion among Senators as to what the procedure with respect to them should be, and how many votes will be required in the Senate for the approval of these

agreements. That will depend upon what we determine to be the character of the agreements.

Mr. President, cannot the joint committee, under the able leadership of our distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, begin to devote some attention to that matter, and consult authorities on international law, and take counsel from any worthy source, and let us determine, if we can, that those engagements which do not require a commitment to the exercise of military force on the part of this country may be regarded as agreements, subject to ratification and validation by a majority of the Senate and a majority of the House, while those engagements which would bind this country to an obligation to use force in case of unprovoked attack upon an ally, might well be regarded as treaties, requiring twothirds vote of the Senate for their ratification?

So, respecting the matter of how many votes it will take for the validity of the instrument to be established in the Congress, respecting the question of how long we will consume in committee and on the floor in consideration and debate, and regarding the very vital matter of the proper place of senatorial representation in the whole matter, respecting those very essential and very vital matters, could not this committee bring together its members, and take counsel from appropriate sources and try to formulate something which will make it possible for the machinery of the United States Government expeditiously and properly to function and in a timely manner to function? Let us do it before it is too late.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Florida for his suggestion. We have such a large element of good spirit on both sides of the Chamber for what we hope will be an acceptable structure of peace, that I am sure we will not have any difficulty about the details. However, I shall be glad to keep in mind what the Senator has suggested.

Mr. WHITE. Mr. President—
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. George in the chair). Does the Senator from Texas yield to the Senator from Maine?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. WHITE. The Senator from Texas has been good enough to refer to me and others upon this side of the Chamber in most kindly fashion, and I want to express to him my very grateful appreciation of the spirit he has manifested and of the words spoken by him.

Mr. President, out of my observation of parliamentary practice there has come to me the very deep conviction that a legislative committee, whether of the House or of the Senate, never rises above the level of leadership of the chairman of the committee. I think whatever has been accomplished in the way of unity, and whatever of helpful suggestions have come from the Foreign Relations Committee during those late months, may be attributed in substantial part to the kindliness, the courtesy, and the tact shown by the Senator from Texas in his

leadership of that committee. He has shown at all times consideration for those of us in the minority. He has shown wisdom, and I think, as is true since he came to the Congress many years ago, he has been motivated at all times by an exalted patriotism.

Mr. President, I have for him profound respect, and I have great confidence that under his leadership greater things will yet be accomplished in the bringing about of this international order for which we all hope.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I am sincerely grateful to the Senator from Maine for these generous and kind remarks which have come as an expression

of his great heart.

Mr. President, we have had this fine spirit in the committee because of the fact that the Senators I have mentioned, and others on the minority side who are members of the Foreign Relations Committee, as well as the distinguished members of the majority on that committee, the Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE], the Senator from Utah [Mr. THOMAS]. the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. BARKLEY], the Senator from Iowa [Mr. GILLETTE !, and other Senators, all have had no other purpose on earth than a purpose of high patriotism and a desire to bring about a solution, so far as solutions can be obtained at all, of this question of international peace and the prevention of war. Were it not for the cooperation and kindly assistance of these Senators we could not have made progress, but we could very easily have had some classic joint debates, and some very outstandingly sharp differences in the committee and on the ficor. It is our purpose to avoid those things.

Mr. President, the preservation of the peace, not simply for ourselves but for all the world, is something which leaps over mountain ranges: it does not stop at international boundaries, it does not stop even at the shore lines of the ocean, but it is something which reaches into the very fundamentals of humanity and humankind. Even if our instrumentality at first may not be perfect-and very few things on this earth are perfect: perfection exists only in another world than this one-even though our instrumentality may not be perfect, yet if we make substantial progress toward diminishing the danger of war and giving security and a promise of peace to the peoples of the earth, we shall achieve as no other legislative body has achieved in all the long and varied centuries that have passed over the heary head of mother earth. Peace and the preservation of peace for the security of nations is something which is greater than partisan politics. It transcends the little temporary victories or defeats which may occur in this Chamber. It transscends political fortunes of individuals.

Mr. President, we see the lists of casualties from the European battlefields and from the far stretches of the Pacific. The War Department lists the soldier's name, lists his address, lists his organization perhaps, and perhaps it lists the names of his parents, but it does not list whether he is a Republican or

Democrat. He is fighting for the Reblic. He is fighting for his native id. He is fighting for his flag. He is t fighting for any puny political conferation. Democratic or Republican.

eration, Democratic or Republican. So, Mr. President, I hope that Sena-'s on both sides of the aisle, and Memrs of the House, may continue not me in their attitude of approaching ese problems in a nonpartisan spirit, t I hope they will use their influence d their power upon those who may be lined to make the question a political e, not to do so, but let the United States America continue the leadership. We ve taken it; let us maintain it. Let accomplish this great ambition of giv-; to the world a leadership which shall ture the establishment of peace mainery that shall offer at least a hope to e world that the generations which low ours shall not be cursed by anier bloody, cruel, and tragic war like it which has already devastated so iny of the fair lands of Europe and of

Mr. VANDENBERG. Mr. President. me say first that I cordially agree th the able and distinguished Senator m Texas in his dedication to an unrtisan approach to this tremendously al achievement which is so desperely essential to civilization. I take it is does not suggest that candid public cussion of the subject should be foresed. On the contrary, I take it, that, President Wilson once said, we should k open covenants openly arrived at, d that it is to the best welfare of the tion that the problems of foreign licy should be laid frankly before the nerican people and discussed frankly t of the heart of our high leadership, long as the objective is the welfare of r common undertaking.

Mr. President, I agree with what the nator from Maine [Mr. White] has id about the work of the chairman of e Foreign Relations Committee. I ow of no experience in my 16 years in e Senate when there have been more nerous, broad-minded, and tolerant efrits to find a unity of purpose at all nes, regardless of partisan politics. ioin in thanking him for his observants regarding whatever contributions have been able to make from this side the aisle in the same spirit.

I rise particularly, however, Mr. Presint, because of an implication in the ggestions made by the Senator from orida [Mr. Pepper], who seems to feel at we have already reached the point here we can leap ahead to the creation a timetable which will foreshorten is entire enterprise and produce a ick net result. I think he suggested at if anyone has any difference of dnion regarding what is going on, he ight to express it now, and not later. Mr. President, I believe there is no ndamental difference of opinion rerding the objective. I think perhaps ere is some difference of opinion among as to the precise method which shall pursued ir arriving at that goal. In ew of the suggestion made by the Senor from Florida I wish to take this casion very briefly to lay down three four fundamental points which will be my own continuous impulse in my continuing effort in connection with this great and vital adventure.

The first thing I wish to say is that, in my view, if this foreshortened world cannot organize a permanent peace, then the murderous ingenuity of modern military science will make an end to our civilization in the next world war; and only those who are blind to these blasting realities, only those who can be complacent in the presence of global suicide, will fail to make every practical effort to organize the peace of this earth against any such calamity. To that objective I dedicate every prayer of my heart and every effort of my remaining years.

Next, Mr. President, I wish to say that, from my point of view, it is too obvious for argument that this objective requires sound international organization to encourage the concord of good will; to stimulate moral and spiritual, as well as physical defenses; to establish organized justice under effective international law as a substitute for force; to create the mechanisms which shall exhaust the rules of reason before there shall be appeals to might; and ultimately, if all these fail, to mobilize the military cooperation which shall defend the conscience of the world.

Third, I wish to say that at the threshold of this aspiration it is equally obvious that the world's criminals of today must be so permanently demilitarized that they can never become the criminals of tomorrow. To that end the immediate and continuous availability of Allied force is indispensable. This is elementary prudence. It is clearly the primary military responsibility of the four major powers. It is a temporary military alliance for a specific and limited purpose, as distinguished from a permanent alliance. Even George Washington, the great, original foe of entangled Americanism, recognized such temporary alliances as wholly legitimate. There must be no such complacency, in softer years to come, in respect to this repressive phase of the problem as was largely responsible for Hitler's sinister violation of Versailles, with the expedient and inexplicable and negligent consent of his subsequent victims.

Now, Mr. President, we come to the question as to the part which military force shall play in the ultimate authority of this international organization which is to be charged with responsibility for the peace of the world. Let there be no doubt about my view that force, as a last resort, shall never be out of sight or out of mind or out of mutual reach. Military force will always have to be the answer to those who understand no other argument. But there can be deeply conscientious differences of honest opinion in respect to the inherent relative importance of military force in this equation.

I am one of those who do not believe that our greatest hope for peace lies in trying to put peace in a steel strait jacket I believe that our greatest hope lies in adequate mechanisms to develop reason and justice in international affairs, which shall be predominately accepted by enlightened peoples—backed always, I repeat, by constant vigilance

against mobilizations of aggressive power. In other words, I doubt whether any hard and fast international contracts looking toward the automatic use of cooperative force in unforeseeable emergencies ahead will be worth any more, when the time comes, than the national consciences of the contracting parties when the hour of acid test arrives. In whatever degree this is correct, our final reliance, even in the mobilization of military force—which, of course, must be available finally—will depend upon the justice of the cause and the peace conscience of the world.

It is for this reason. Mr. President. that I believe that a just peace, in the first instance, is the indispensable beginning of this great adventure, because in my view a good league cannot cure a bad peace, either now or hereafter. It is for this reason that I like those words in the Republican national platform, if I. may refer to it not in a partisan sense but in a historical sense—words which have been amazingly misunderstoodwhich pledge the use of peace forces to stop the aggressors of tomorrow. Peace forces means to me whatever force-moral, diplomatic, economic, or military—is necessary to keep the peace whenever the emergency arises. In my humble view, the first three of these forces are likely to be more useful than the last, although the last must never be ignored and must never be unavailable.

Let me add a final word to this swift summary. I want my country to play her full, legitimate, and effective role in this evolution out of recurrent world savagery. I believe she can play her greatest role by remaining always and forever the free, sovereign, and independent United States of America. I believe that her voice will always be the most disinterested and judicial voice in the concerts of the world; and such a voice should never be muted. I believe that we can collaborate wholeheartedly in building up the "peace forces" which shall minimize, and probably prevent, another World War tragedy; and I have no thought that we have parted with any essential sovereignty when, for example. we ourselves recognize justiciable issues in a greatly broadened and strengthened international law which we ourselves have helped to write, and which we approve.

I have the profound conviction that if this international machinery is adequately created to implement a just peace, and again I emphasize the adjective, and if the major powers strive faithfully to organize and support these "peace forces" of the earth, any pirate of tomorrow who defies this process will be so clearly criminal in character and so clearly due for physical restraint that there will be no default, on the part of ourselves or of any others, in the united, voluntary military action which will produce invincible repression.

Mr. President, that, in a general quick summary, indicates my feeling about this tremendously important subject. I think it ought to be plain that the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee, to which considerable reference has been made, in its conferences at the State Department has dealt solely with the question of international organization for peace. It has had no approach to the considerations involved in the writing of the terms of the peace itself. That has been outside our jurisdiction thus far. If there has been any sort of difference of opinion among Senators, the great difference has been over the inability of some of us to separate our conception of the international machinery which we are attempting to create from the type and character of the peace itself-the type of a post-war status quo which our organization in the first instance must underwrite and undertake to sustain. My own very deep conviction, I repeat. is that we cannot separate the possibility of final and conclusive success for our organization from the justice and the equity of the peace agreement which in the first instance it must underlake to administer.

But in the present temper of the American people and in the present approach which is being made to this subject throughout the country, if we will just credit good faith to those who want to publicly discuss the subject. I know of no reason why we should not proceed to a net result which will be a benediction on the world. I do not think there is any disadvantage in full public discussion, so long as it is well-founded and proceeds in good faith. On the contrary, I think that in the last year or two our chief difficulty has been a lack of adequate public information about some phases of the problem-a lack of information which inevitably invites gossip and rumor and speculation-a lack of information particularly regarding postwar understandings at Casablanca, Quebec, Cairo, and Tcheran,

Under the existing circumstances, particularly in the light of what is a very recent accord between high spokesmen for political parties in the United States respecting a mutual desire to achieve this goal, in my view the conference at Dumbarton Oaks meets under the happiest possible promise of good effect.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, first I wish to say that I am very happy about the remarks which have been made by various Senators. I especially approve what the Senator from Michigan IMr. Vandenberg! has said about public discussion of these all-important questions. I think we should have public discussion. I think every man in public life should have convictions on this great subject, and should express his convictions. So I am quite happy about the discussion.

There was one matter, however, in the course of the remarks of the Senator from Michigan which disturbed me just a little, and I wish to propound to him a question relating to it, to see whether I correctly understood him. In the course of his remarks the Senator frem Michigan more than once referred to a world organization implementing the peace. His words indicated, to my mind, that perhaps the Senator from Michigan thought we should postpone discussions of such a world organization until after the peace is finally agreed

upon. I should like to inquire of the Senator from Michigan whether I misunderstood him in that respect.

Mr. VANDENBERG. Mr. President, I am grateful to the Senator from New Mexico for asking me the question, especially if there could be the slightest doubt or implication in connection with my previous remarks. My answer to him regarding postponement of all these discussions is emphatically "No." The planning of the world peace organization should proceed at a maximum speed to a conclusion as early as circumstances and events will permit.

What I said, or at least what I meant to say, was that those who in the future must make the final decisions respecting the international organization, I think should also be highly and intimately informed, concurrently, regarding the thinking of these governments in respect to the kind of a peace which is contemplated; because, I repeat, I think there are more possible germs of future disaster in the wrong kind of a peace than there are in even the wrong kind of a league. I think the subjects are inseperable.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I wish to say to the Senator from Michigan that perhaps the question arose in my mind, not as a result of what he said, but from my own lack of understanding. But I am very glad that I asked the question, and I am deeply gratified at the explanation the Senator has given. Of course, it is in accord with my view.

Mr. VANDENBERG. I wish to make very sure that I am correctly understood. I am not one of those who think this new instrumentality should be used as the one to make the peace. I am entirely in disagreement with any such view. I think the two functions are totally unrelated.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, let me say that I know of no one who does not take that view.

INVESTIGATION OF THE NATIONAL DE-FENSE PROGRAM—REAM GENERAL HOS-PITAL (FORMERLY THE EREAKERS HOTEL) (PT. 19 OF REPT. NO. 10)

Mr. KILGORE. Mr. President, in December of 1942, the War Department acquired the Breakers Hotel, in Palm Beach, one of America's famous luxury hotels. The hotel was taken for use as a station hospital. After about 412 months' use, during which only a small portion of the beds were filled, the Air Corps, who were operating the station hospital, decided they had no further use for it. The hospital was then transferred to the Surgeon General for use as a general hospital, known as the Ream General Hospital. After a few more months the War Department announced that it was abandoning the Breakers Hotel. There was considerable public discussion of this, as a result of which an investigation was undertaken by the Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program.

After an investigation, including the examination of witnesses on the ground the committee arrived at the following conclusions:

The Breekers should never have been acquired. The War Department seriously underestimated its fair rental cost. It was the most expensive hotel property in the vicinity. Its advantages over other similar first-class hotels in the vicinity were primarily in luxuries.

The manner of acquisition, as in the case of other hotel properties in the Florida area, was high-handed and arbitrary. The officers in charge of the take-over acted on very short notice with practically no consideration for the owners, whereas they should have been able to give the owners sufficient notice. This occurred in many other hotel acquisitions as well. The officers in charge for the Army valued the hotel entirely too low. The owners feel an attempt was made to force them to accept these valuations by indicating that it would be unpatriotic to try to get a fair return. Other instances of similar attempts appeared in other Florida hotel acquisitions. The owners had the financial ability to resist and because of such ability they will receive a rent which is exactly twice what was first offered.

After the Breakers had been discontinued as a station hospital the decision to convert it into a general hospital was proper. The large structure had been practically empty during most of the time it was used as a station hospital. Rent and large renovation charges had been incurred. By using this very desirable property as a general hospital, the Government provided what the Surgeon General termed "a model institution," and at the same time proceeded to get something for its money.

The original decision to abandon the Breakers was made with insufficient consideration. A second decision affirming the original one was made 4 months later, after a detailed study of the question by a board of officers. As shown below this decision was not justified by the facts.

The Breakers should not have been abandoned at this time in view of the large financial obligation which was incurred. Representatives of the Surgeon General have testified that the Breakers is an excellent hospital. It has been characterized by the Surgeon General as one of his best general hospitals, and a model Institution. The testimony before this committee is that the beds in the Breakers Hospital could be used. The facility itself and its location were excellent. The reasons given for its abandonment are not convincing. It appears that the property was abandoned because the War Department discovered it to have been a very poor original transaction, which resulted in a property which was bound to be too expensive. The loss would be incurred, whether or not the property was returned. The cost of keeping the property, over and above the cost of returning it, was moderate. However, pressure from civilian groups to return the Breakers Hotel, added to the fact that the entire property, taken as a whole, was a poor original investment apparently prompted the War Department to return it.

In order fully to appreciate the War Department's position in connection with the Breakers, the committee carefully