

The United States and the United Nations

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UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE UNITED NATIONS

by

FRANCIS O. WILCOX*

IT HAS BEEN said that if the United Nations were not in existence it would have to be invented. This is something that many of us tend to forget in the United States where we are inclined to evaluate political institutions in terms of short-range successes or failures rather than the longer-range goals to which they are dedicated. It is a mistake which we can not afford to make about the United Nations. Its goals are so important that, in spite of temporary disappointments or set-backs, we must continue to help make it an effective instrumentality for world peace.

The Present Status of the United Nations

No one can deny that we are facing a very critical period in

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the history of the United Nations. Some people go so far as to predict that the United Nations is already doomed to suffer the fate of the League of Nations. I am not that pessimistic. Nevertheless, the extremely difficult situation that confronts the United Nations in the Congo, the persistent attacks of the Soviet Union upon the Secretary General, the serious financial crisis that afflicts the Organization, together with the negative attitude that General de Gaulle has recently expressed—these things suggest that it is really in a period of grave jeopardy.

Among American supporters of the United Nations there are still other causes for serious concern. The principal one stems from the view that the substantial majority which the United States has enjoyed in the General Assembly from the beginning is apparently being whittled away by the influx of new members and the more aggressive attitude of the Soviet Union and its satellite states.

With respect to the future, there are many uncertain elements in the picture. It is somewhat early to make any long-range predictions about the future of the United Nations or our relationship to it. It is clear, however, that one very important element in the situation remains the attitude of the small states, both old and new. It is not yet clear whether our friends will act with the degree of unity and solidarity that is necessary; nor is it clear that the new members of the Organization will act with the responsibility which the situation requires.

Another uncertain element is the Soviet attitude. Soviet tactics in the United Nations will, no doubt, reflect the state of our bilateral relationships with the Soviet Union. Just what their posture will be will depend, in part at least, upon the soundings

which they are conducting with respect to the Kennedy Administration.

Mr. Khrushchev's Proposal

Let us go back to the Fifteenth General Assembly, when the present crisis began with Mr. Khrushchev's appearance in New York. It is true that he received a great deal of publicity throughout the country. I do not believe, however, that he achieved his objectives. Certainly he did not have his way about the Congo. He did not destroy the United Nations. He did not get to debate the question of disarmament in the Assembly as he wanted to do. Moreover, his incredibly bad manners—exhibited when he pounded the desk with his shoe, when he called the Security Council a spittoon, and when he referred to the Philippine delegate as a stooge and a jerk—shocked many delegates who obviously had higher regard for dignified parliamentary behavior than Mr. Khrushchev did.

Far more dangerous to the United Nations was his proposal that Mr. Hammarskjold resign and be replaced with three Secretaries General, each armed with a veto power. There has been a good deal of speculation as to just what Mr. Khrushchev had in mind when he launched his bitter attack upon the Secretary General. Was he attempting to destroy the Organization? Was he bent on eliminating the Secretary General, who has given more direction and purpose to the United Nations than Mr. Khrushchev thought desirable? Was he subjecting the world to cold war tactics on the ground it is good psychology to stir up trouble now and then? Or was he putting on an act to convince the Red Chinese that he is a tough leader who can command attention outside the communist sphere?

Students of Soviet history may recall the words Lenin wrote forty years ago when he reminded the Bolsheviks they were "obliged to carry on the struggle in parliament in order to destroy parliament." Perhaps that is what Mr. Khrushchev had in mind. One can only speculate about his objectives. The fact is, however, that if his proposal to create three Secretaries General were adopted, it would be an irreparable blow to the United Nations. It would water down the Secretariat to the point where it would have no vitality and would threaten it with a veto on every important issue. One can imagine what would happen if Mr. Hammarskjöld had to secure the countersignatures of two colleagues, one from the Communist world and one from the so-called neutralist world, every time he sent a telegram of instructions to the Congo!

During the past fifteen years, we have learned how much a competent Secretariat made up of fair minded, intelligent individuals can do on behalf of peace. It would be a tragic thing if that lesson were now forgotten or discarded. I do not believe it will be. Indeed, many people realize that Mr. Khrushchev's attack upon the United Nations is not only a danger; it is, in its way, a compliment to the Organization. The fact is the United Nations has proved an effective obstacle to the very thing that seems to interest the Soviet Union most at this time in history; that is, destroying the independence and integrity of small countries. In any event, the extreme proposal Mr. Khrushchev made had practically no support outside the Soviet bloc.

The Possibility of Compromise

One of the dangers we now face lies in further ill-conceived moves to compromise with the Soviet Union. All too often the Soviet Union has made an outrageous proposal with the

expectation that other member countries will take up the cudgel on behalf of a second proposal perhaps only a half or a third as outrageous as the original. In this way a spirit of compromise is generated which can lead to harmful results unless it is properly checked. A great majority of the members, I think, understand Mr. Khrushchev's proposal for just what it was—an attack, not upon the United States, or on Mr. Hammarskjöld as a person, or on what he is doing in the Congo, but upon the United Nations itself. Recognizing this, they have rallied to the support of an effective United Nations and an effective Secretary General.

To the smaller nations, the United Nations has enormous value. It was designed to protect their independence and their integrity and to help them in advancing their people's welfare. It is also a center where a small state can greatly enhance its influence by joining with other like-minded states to achieve common objectives. But most important, membership in the United Nations is a symbol of each country's standing and dignity as a sovereign state. In the circumstances one can understand why many of these countries resented Mr. Khrushchev's proposal.

Representation for Asia and Africa

I agree with the Soviet contention that the United Nations should be reorganized so as to reflect the realities of the 1960's. But what is needed is not a reshuffling of the Secretariat. What is needed is an increase in the seats available in the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council so as to give adequate representation to the countries of Asia and Africa. Although the membership of the United Nations has nearly

doubled in fifteen years, during that time the size of the major councils has remained exactly the same.

The Security Council, for example, was set up as a body of eleven members designed to represent the interests of 51 countries. Since San Francisco, however, 48 members have been added to the United Nations, many of which aspire to membership on the Council. Since most of the new members come from Asia and Africa, it follows that these are the areas that are most drastically underrepresented. But these countries are deeply interested in the United Nations. They come to the Organization with new ideas and enthusiasm, and we must use this creative energy by providing ample opportunities for them to participate in its activities. The latest addition of seventeen members makes any further delay both undesirable and intolerable.

Now, you may ask, why has not this been done? For the simple reason that the Soviet Union made it clear that it would not permit any amendments to the Charter unless Red China were admitted. The Soviet delegate made this very emphatic when he repeated his point in Russian, English, French, Spanish, and Chinese so that no one could possibly misunderstand.

This leads me to make one comment about the role of the smaller states in the United Nations. They carry a tremendous responsibility for, to a great extent, the future and the destiny of the Organization lies in their hands. If they play their role with courage and conviction, and if they will stand up for what is right, they can do much to assure for the United Nations a reasonably bright future. But if they are weak and irresolute, if they are divided and uncertain, they will lose a great opportunity to promote the cause of world peace. There is a real challenge here for the small states who can, if they will, encourage

the Soviet Union to move to a more reasonable course of action through the inexorable force of public opinion. I am not suggesting that they support the United States in all respects; all I am asking is that they give their loyal support to the United Nations and the principles for which it stands.

Soviet Imperialism

In this connection, a word should be said about Soviet imperialism. Everywhere in Asia and Africa during the last fifteen years, new countries have come of age and have been granted their freedom. Over a billion people have earned the right to govern themselves and have become members of the United Nations. The Western colonial systems have rapidly liquidated themselves, leaving behind a framework of modern techniques and aspirations. On the whole, this process has been remarkably peaceful. There has been some turmoil, to be sure. But, in general, states have won their independence by peaceful means, by the vote, by passive resistance, and by demonstrating their capacity to handle their own affairs.

As this process has altered the face of the globe, the direct opposite was taking place all around the Soviet periphery. Wherever the influence of the Red Army could be brought to bear, independent countries were being snuffed out or reduced to puppet status. Except where the free world made it clear that Soviet force would not be permitted to prevail, every state bordering on the Soviet Union lost its independence.

Here is one of the most striking paradoxes of our time. The Soviet Union seeks to pose as the champion of oppressed peoples. But clearly the Soviet Union and Red China are the only important imperialist powers left today. In October 1960, while we were debating colonialism in the Assembly, I was re-

minding the delegations present of this fact when I was interrupted by violent outbursts from the Rumanian delegation and by vigorous shoe pounding on the part of Mr. Khrushchev. This rude and intemperate behavior, which certainly shocked most delegates, is a clear indication that the Soviet satellite system is the tenderest spot in the Soviet anatomy.

It is obvious from this and other examples, that what the Soviet Union wants is a double standard in the United Nations. They want to feel perfectly free to criticize other countries for their shortcomings, but they cannot bear to have anyone tell the truth about their own misdeeds. So far as the United States is concerned, I hope we will continue to tell the truth about Soviet colonialism. And if the shoe fits, then the Soviet delegate ought to put it on, rather than pound the table with it.

Soviet Attitude Towards the UN

In our attempt to understand the attitude of the Soviet Union towards the United Nations, it is important to recall one of the basic truths which govern the participation of any nation in an international organization: a state ordinarily decides to participate as a means of furthering its own national objectives. In the United Nations there are many countries whose long-range goals coincide with those of the Charter. The United States is one of these countries. There are others whose policy objectives appear to be at variance with the principles of the United Nations but who have joined the Organization because they hope to utilize it to serve their own purposes. The Soviet Union falls into the latter category.

The Charter dedicates the United Nations to the maintenance of peace; to the development of friendly relations be-

tween nations; and to cooperation in the solution of the major problems which beset mankind. Simply stated, the goal of the United Nations is to help create those conditions which will make it possible for man, living in peace with his neighbors, to enjoy material and spiritual growth. The United States does not have any reluctance in sincerely subscribing to goals like these. Our national aims and the aims of the United Nations are basically the same.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has often proclaimed its determination to win the world to communism. It has pursued this aim through overt aggression, economic imperialism, subversion, and threat of force. To the Soviet Union, membership does not mean adherence to United Nations objectives, except insofar as Soviet leaders judge that these can be used to advance the interests of the Soviet Union and world communism. It is a marriage of convenience and not of love.

We are frequently reminded that, as a member of the League of Nations, the Soviet Union championed the principle of collective security and the idea of universal disarmament. On the whole their operating strategy was one of political expediency. When their security was threatened by the aggressive designs of fascism and national socialism they supported the League with enthusiasm. When, on the other hand, the League tended to clash with Soviet objectives they flouted its authority the moment it suited their purposes.

Just what Soviet leaders had in mind when they joined the United Nations is not clear. It may be, as some believe, they were motivated primarily by considerations of national security or by the pressure of world opinion. It may be they regarded the United Nations as a counter-revolutionary bourgeois parliament which they joined to undermine and destroy from within. Or it may be they had no preconceived notions about their re-

lations with the Organization, but joined with the idea of co-operating or not as their national interests dictate from time to time.

Whatever theory one may hold, it is apparent that the Soviet attitude towards the United Nations is not static; it is evolving with the changing world scene. It is equally apparent that Soviet leaders, despite their frequent expressions of contempt and disdain, view participation in the United Nations as an important aspect of their policy.

There are a good many reasons why this is so. By maintaining membership in the United Nations, Soviet leaders can promote the idea of their own respectability and humanitarianism, qualities notably lacking in the Soviet approach. Moreover, they can utilize the great world forum to spread to an increasingly wide audience, the communist recipe for peace. Above all, they can seek to frustrate, or at least blunt, from within the Organization, any contemplated action which might conflict with the communist program.

From the Soviet point of view this requires a greater degree of control over the United Nations than they have been able to exercise during the past 15 years. Now they are doing their utmost to make up for lost time. In addition to their attack upon the Secretary General, they have attempted to extend their influence in a variety of ways:

1. They insisted upon parity in the disarmament negotiations thus winning equal representation (a five-to-five ratio) for Soviet bloc and Western countries. This victory they are now using as a precedent in their constant attempt to gain status and prestige for their satellite states in United Nations circles.

2. They have refused to pay their share of the cost of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East and of the Congo operation in spite of the fact that these costs were

approved by the Assembly, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter. Thus they are attempting to extend their veto power to the General Assembly.

3. They have demanded of the Secretary General that at least 50 Soviet citizens be placed in key posts in the United Nations Secretariat. Since the Soviets reject the principle of an objective international civil service, these additions would permit them to slant the policies and programs of the United Nations in the direction of communism.

4. They have done an about face and renewed their interest in the specialized agencies whose programs of social and economic betterment they used to regard with utter contempt. This was done to win the support of the underdeveloped countries.

5. They have greatly intensified their efforts to win, for themselves and their satellites, committee chairmanships and other posts of influence and prestige in the United Nations.

6. Finally, it is well known that in their relations with other delegations they are following more flexible tactics than in the past. On occasion they have even switched from their traditional hard line to a friendly and co-operative approach.

Clearly no one of these steps, looked at alone, would constitute a serious threat to the integrity of the United Nations. But taken together they indicate the important dimensions of the offensive mounted by the Soviet Union. How far will this offensive go? No one can predict with any degree of accuracy. We know from bitter experience, however, that whenever Soviet leaders get their foot in a door they do not take it out unless someone steps on their corns.

At the present writing, the Soviet "troika" policy is spreading like poison ivy. In Geneva the Soviet delegation recently demanded that the control organ contemplated for the nuclear

test-ban treaty be headed up by an East-West-Neutral bloc triumvirate with a built-in veto. A somewhat similar demand has been made with respect to the international control commission on Laos. And if press reports are accurate, comparable demands will be put forth in connection with any future disarmament negotiations.

This is the veto principle in a new and expanded form. In effect Soviet leaders are saying that in the future they do not intend to subject the Soviet Union to any joint action which affects the vital interests of their country unless they have the right to cast the deciding vote. If this position is held, it will not only make serious negotiations between the communist bloc and the West practically impossible; it will do irreparable damage to the whole fabric of international relations that has been laboriously built up since the turn of the century.

Suggestions of a Procedural or Organizational Nature

With this background in mind, let us turn to a few suggestions relating to the strengthening of the United Nations and the improvement of our position in it. I do this with some temerity, because different people draw different conclusions from the same experience; what I have learned during the past fifteen years might not coincide with what others have learned.

Unity Among the Free Countries

From an organizational and procedural point of view, it is of the utmost importance that we strongly encourage a greater spirit of unity and teamwork among free nations in the Organization. True, the United States does not want satellites and we

certainly want to avoid leaving the impression that we are trying to create a *bloc* of states within the United Nations. We have always been proud of the strength that comes from diversity of view and independence of action. Nevertheless, as the Soviet Union intensifies its efforts in the United Nations to subvert, to disrupt, to discredit, and to destroy, the free nations will have to accept that challenge for what it is worth. They will find it necessary to concert on their policies and programs and coordinate their activities far more than they have in the past if they are to preserve the integrity of the United Nations and move ahead with the objectives of the free world.

At present one of the weakest links in the free world chain stems from the coolness of France. Incensed by the Suez incident, and angered by the repeated needling they regularly receive from the Assembly on Algeria, the French have been somewhat less than enthusiastic about the Organization during the past few years. On occasion this aloofness seriously handicaps the efforts of the free nations to take vigorous and constructive action.

Today, however, Suez is five years behind us, and the problem of Algeria is hopefully on its way towards solution. Even more pertinent is the fact that many French-speaking members of the French community, who entered the United Nations in 1960, look to the Quai d'Orsay for guidance and counsel. Many friends of France hope the French will soon turn another page and begin to play once more the helpful and influential role they are capable of playing.

This leads me to comment briefly on the attitude of Western Europe generally. I have talked to many diplomats from the area during the past few years and, as a rule, they are quite pessimistic about the United Nations. As one Foreign Minister

put it: "The Assembly is becoming increasingly unwieldy and unreliable as a result of the influx of new members from Asia and Africa. Given the anti-colonial sentiment that exists there, the cards are stacked against the countries of Western Europe; we do not think we can take any important issue to the UN and hope to get a fair deal. We do not intend to withdraw, but as the United Nations is presently constituted it is certainly not something we can rely on to protect our national interests."

One can appreciate the growing concern which these countries have. At the same time it can be argued that the United Nations holds very important benefits for them which they should not underestimate. It is, for example, by far the most powerful force in the world today working to give validity to those rules of conduct in international relations which the West has traditionally stood for. Still more important, the United Nations offers the only viable alternative to the old colonial system, providing, as it does, opportunities for peaceful adjustment and continued cooperation in the working relations between newly-emerging states and the former mother countries.

Dutch New Guinea (or West Irian) and Angola might be cited as cases in point. Obviously, new relationships between these areas, on the one hand, and the Netherlands and Portugal on the other, will have to be evolved. The United Nations, if it is given a chance, can help find these relationships. To paraphrase a distinguished poet, we are in fact "wandering between two worlds, one dead, the other powerless to be born." In this situation, which is of the utmost political and economic importance to many of the countries of Western Europe, the United Nations can serve as an indispensable midwife.

I come back to my emphasis upon the need for greater unity and teamwork among the free nations. The fact is, the growth

of communist power and influence in the United Nations is going to compel the free countries, sooner or later, to work much more closely together than they have in the past, and the sooner this is done the less painful it will be.

Senor de Madariaga, the Spanish statesman and author, put it well when he wrote:

"The trouble today is that the Communist world understands unity but not liberty, while the free world understands liberty but not unity. Eventual victory may be won by the first of the two sides to achieve the synthesis of both liberty and unity."

The General Assembly: Some Procedural Needs

The time has come also for us to urge a thorough review of the organization and procedures of the Assembly. The sheer size of the United Nations—if last year is any indication of the problems involved—makes such a review imperative. Otherwise the Assembly may degenerate into an unwieldy propaganda forum incapable of taking effective action. Bolivia, Costa Rica, and the United Kingdom proposed last year that a study be made of Assembly procedures with the idea of making it a more effective instrumentality for world peace. This is definitely in the interests of the United Nations and the free world, and we should strongly support such a move.

Are other organs of the United Nations—such as the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat—being used to the best possible advantage? Could the Assembly devolve more of its task upon subsidiary organs which could function between sessions of the Assembly? Can more satisfactory methods be devised to insure the selection of competent presiding officers and other officials? Would a system of subcommittees be helpful in

easing the work-load of the seven regular committees of the Assembly? Is there any acceptable way of effectively limiting debate in the Assembly? Can more adequate methods be agreed upon for screening the items to be included on the agenda? What can be done to clarify the rules of procedure, some of which have been subject to serious abuse in recent years?

These are only a few of the questions which ought to be examined in connection with any attempt to review the organization and procedures of the Assembly. They indicate, however, how important the task is.

In that connection, I was interested to note in 1960 the extent to which the Soviet bloc has developed its working knowledge of parliamentary tactics and procedures. In the early days most of the able parliamentarians came from Western Europe, Latin America, and the Old Commonwealth countries. This is no longer true. Today the Soviet bloc, and certain Afro-Asian delegates, are becoming more skilled in parliamentary tactics, and in some cases they have used this skill to good advantage. During the last Assembly there seemed to be a dearth of able, free-world delegates who knew the practices and procedures of the Assembly and who were willing to assume leadership roles. If this is a trend it certainly ought to be reversed.

United States Delegation in New York

Now let us turn briefly to the representation of the United States in the United Nations. In addition to strengthening our mission in New York—which has already been done—one improvement which occurs to me immediately has to do with the nature of the delegation which we send to the Assembly. I think the time has come when we should move in the direction

of professionalizing our delegation. There can be no doubt that outstanding Americans have made remarkable contributions to our work in the United Nations both during their service on the delegation and after returning to their local communities. Today, however, in view of the fact that the United Nations is a much more complex operation than it used to be, and in view of the fact that the Soviet Union is taking a more aggressive attitude, we should utilize to the fullest the talents of our skilled diplomats at the ambassadorial level. The stakes are too high to do otherwise. Certainly it is unfair for our government to expect newcomers to diplomacy to compete on even terms with Deputy Foreign Ministers from Moscow and Soviet Ambassadors to London, Paris, and Rome who have attended many meetings of the Assembly. If outsiders are used as delegates, then our government should consider inviting individuals who have served on previous delegations or who have had comparable diplomatic experience.

In that connection, there is much that can be done to improve our representation procedures. We have been short of representation funds, and we have not had satisfactory housing arrangements for personnel living in New York. We must never lose sight of the fact that there are now ninety-nine members instead of fifty-one, and the task of explaining our point of view and of winning support for our policies will be much greater than it used to be. It is no longer sufficient to maintain close working relations with a relatively few key delegations; we must strive to establish wider and more systematic contacts with many delegations. It is true that good will cannot be bought at the dinner table, but neither should our mission in New York be handicapped by a shortage of entertainment funds.

In that connection, too, it is obvious that we ought to do what we can, on an urgent basis, to encourage hospitable treatment for United Nations delegations from the new countries of Asia and Africa. One person turned away from an eating establishment because of the color of his skin can do much to offset the good will laboriously built up over months of time. The citizens of New York—as well as our United States Mission there—are doing noble work in extending hospitality and in easing problems relating to such matters as housing and educational facilities for newly arrived diplomats and their families. It is time the American people in every state realized that what they do as individuals—in the field of race relations especially—can have an important bearing upon the achievement of our national objectives in the United Nations.

US Attitude Towards Substantive Issues

I have outlined some of the procedural and organizational problems that need attention. Progress in these directions can contribute materially towards the improvement of our posture in the United Nations. Far more important, however, are substantive issues on which, for a variety of reasons, our government has taken what many other countries consider an essentially negative stand. Whether we will wish to make further adjustments in our policies I do not know, but clearly we could improve our position if we could relax somewhat our attitude towards these problems.

Admission of Red China

First and foremost is the problem of Red China. Many people argue vigorously that, at long last, we should face up to reality and agree to the seating of Communist China before we are pushed into an ignominious surrender on communist terms. It is true that in 1960 our delegation carried our position in the Assembly only after hard work to line up support, and then only by a narrow voting margin. It is true, also, that a good many friendly states vote with us not because they share our convictions but only because we ask them to. Moreover, if the attitudes expressed recently in Brazil, Canada, and the United Kingdom are indicative of the shifting tide of world opinion, it is probably true that the moratorium formula—whereby the Assembly decides to postpone for another year further discussion of the China problem—may have outlived its usefulness.

There are two factors, however, that would make any satisfactory solution of the China question extremely difficult at this time. The first is the strong opposition of the American people and of the Congress to the seating of Red China. This opposition was vigorously reflected in both party platforms in 1960 and in the campaign speeches of Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kennedy. It was reiterated in May, 1961, during Vice-President Lyndon Johnson's visit to Asia. If popular support for the United Nations in this country were to fall away as a result of the admission of Red China, this would, indeed, be a very serious handicap for the future of the Organization.

The second factor is the discouragingly negative attitude of both Nationalist and Red China—the latter being particularly vocal in its negativism. So long as these governments refuse to

talk about the possibility of any solution that would envisage the presence of the other China in the Organization, the United States would find it difficult to move off dead center. This is especially true in view of our mutual defense treaty with Nationalist China and our obligations to help preserve the integrity of Taiwan as an independent entity.

In this evolving situation, it would seem to me that our government might well take as its point of departure the continuing membership of Nationalist China. It is my impression that relatively few states would wish to support a solution which would result in forcing Nationalist China out of the United Nations; many of them may be sincere in their desire to have Communist China in, but it does not follow that they want Nationalist China out. If a separate vote could be taken on this issue alone, I believe that a substantial majority would be recorded against extinction of Taiwan as an independent state.

This being the case—if the moratorium formula should prove no longer workable—we should look towards the formulation of a new tactical position in the United Nations which would tap this attitude of mind. If this were done we would, in effect, be taking steps to shift the onus for the failure to seat Red China to the Peiping government where it belongs; first, because it has not behaved like a government ought to behave in order to be welcomed into the United Nations; and second, because it continues vigorously to oppose what other members believe to be a reasonable solution to the problem.

It will be argued that this suggestion is only a temporary expedient that fails to get at the basic issue involved in the Red China question. As a next step, however, it would put us in a more positive posture than we have maintained during recent years.

United Nations Economic Assistance

A second area where we have taken a somewhat negative position has to do with the extension of aid to underdeveloped areas. For some years, many members have loudly insisted that the United States ought to take the lead in setting up a large-scale economic development program under the auspices of the United Nations. If there is any one thing the underdeveloped areas want, it is the kind of development program in which they can sit down around a table with their colleagues in order to discuss and plan, on the basis of equality, the economic development of their countries.

There are two principal arguments one often hears against our participation in this kind of program. The first is that it would cost too much. If we were to get involved in this type of activity, the argument runs, it would soon develop into a bottomless pit into which we might be called upon to pour out countless billions of dollars in the almost hopeless task of raising to a reasonable level the standard of living of the rest of the world. The fact is, of course, there exists in United Nations procedures a built-in control which automatically regulates the contribution the United States would have to make to any program of this nature; that is the ability of *other* countries to contribute their fair share. It is easier for us to meet our financial obligations in the United Nations than it is for most other members of the Organization to meet theirs. So in the normal process of drawing up an acceptable contributions scale, there is a built-in thermostat that would keep the expenditures of the United Nations within reasonable bounds.

The other argument has to do with the role of the Soviet Union and the possibility that any such development program

might fall under Russian domination or Russian control. I believe this is a misleading argument which we ought to look at again in the light of our experience in the Organization. During the past fifteen years we have participated in many United Nations activities which have required special financing—including the Children's Fund, the Technical Assistance Program, the Special Fund, and several refugee programs—and in none of these has the Soviet Union exercised undue influence. I doubt that the threat of Soviet control would be serious in connection with economic development, particularly since the Soviet Union has not shown the slightest interest in making a contribution to such a program.

We would certainly want to avoid imposing upon the United Nations a larger program than it could digest effectively. We might, therefore, develop a formula which would permit us to divert aid funds from bilateral to multilateral channels gradually over a period of time as the United Nations proves its worth. This would have the double advantage of strengthening the United Nations and of producing at least twice as much aid per dollar as is now furnished by our bilateral assistance programs. It would also win for the United States an incalculable amount of good will.

Colonial Questions

Still a third area where the United States has often taken a relatively negative position lies in the ill-defined field of colonialism. Many of our friends cannot understand why we talk so much about freedom and independence and then support our NATO partners on concrete colonial issues. In recent years it has been clear to many of us why our government has not always been able to vote with the Asian and African countries on

colonial questions. In many instances we have been deeply torn between our NATO alliance, on the one hand, and our sympathy with the aspirations of the newly developing countries on the other. In view of the importance of our security ties with Western Europe we have hesitated to vote for any proposal that might have the effect of weakening the NATO system.

But what was true a few years ago does not necessarily remain true today. At this period in history the process of liquidating the colonial empires of the Western nations has reached such an advanced stage that few occasions will arise in the future when a specific vote by the United States will result in a weakening of the NATO alliance. It seems to me, therefore, that we are in a fairly good position to encourage our Western allies to move ahead with the final steps of the liquidation process. At the same time we ought to make it clear to them that they should not expect us to support their position on colonial questions—merely because of our alliance—where the bitter opposition of the Asian-African countries is certain to result.

Such a policy would inevitably bring in its wake angry charges that the United States is deserting its NATO partners to curry favor with its African friends. This is precisely what happened when we voted for a United Nations inquiry into Portugal's policy in Angola. On the horns of this dilemma our government has a two-fold task to perform; that of reassuring Western Europe and at the same time convincing Africa (and Asia) that the strengthening of NATO is not at all inconsistent with the development of peace and progress in Africa.

Indeed, from our point of view the two things are quite complementary. For unless Western Europe continues to pros-

per, there will not be sufficient financial and human resources to make real headway in the development of the African continent. If our African friends understood this basic principle more thoroughly, they might be somewhat less reluctant, in the United Nations, in compelling us to choose between support for our NATO alliance and support for Africa.

Other Issues: The Financial Crisis

Space will not permit detailed discussion of other issues. Clearly, however, the extent to which the United States can improve its posture in the United Nations with respect to such matters as disarmament, Palestine refugees, human rights, and the Congo will depend upon a number of factors closely bound up with our total foreign policy objectives. It is desirable, of course, to be on the winning side of votes in the Assembly, but friendly relations in the United Nations is not an end in itself. We do not want to get involved in a popularity contest, particularly if our over-all foreign policy goals should suffer in the process.

With respect to the Congo, it is a source of some satisfaction to me that our government has given its unflagging support to the United Nations in its efforts to bring stability to that unhappy land. The situation there is still bad enough, but if it had not been for our consistent help the United Nations would have failed in its mission, and utter chaos would have descended upon the Congo.

Meanwhile, the Congo situation underscores the precarious financial predicament of the Organization. Somehow a method must be found to provide a more substantial and a more reliable fiscal base for the United Nations. It is a terrible thing to have

the Secretary General go around with his hat in his hand desperately trying to collect enough money to take care of world crises that arise.

In some ways the financial crisis the United Nations is trying to surmount constitutes a greater threat to the integrity of the Organization than the excessive use of the veto. It is obvious that unless the members rally to the support of the United Nations its future usefulness will be seriously limited and it will run the grave risk of foundering on the shoals of fiscal insolvency.

The greatest single obstacle to financial stability lies in the categorical refusal of the Soviet Union to contribute its share of the expenses of the Congo operation on the ground that it does not approve what the United Nations is doing there. But is this a sound basis for any nation to refuse to contribute? Is it not obvious that if every member were free to pick and choose the portions of the Organization's budget it is willing to help finance that we would have fiscal chaos?

This is precisely the reason the Charter imposes on all members the obligation to pay their share of expenses as apportioned by the General Assembly. It is the reason, also, that any member whose arrears equal the amount of contributions due for the preceding two years must forfeit its voting rights.

Even if the added expense imposed by the Congo should double the budget, the cost of supporting the United Nations is still incredibly small. In 1959, our contribution to all United Nations activities amounted to only sixty-one cents per capita. With United Nations expenditures then running something over \$200,000,000 per year, and world arms expenditures running nearly \$125 billion, it is obvious that the nations of the

world have not yet put the Organization in proper perspective. We have not yet attached to it the significance it deserves in its all-important task of keeping the peace.

As the Secretary-General has stated, the United Nations has two alternatives: it must face the economic consequences of its own actions, or it must change the substantive policies on which those actions are based. The time has come for the United States to take the lead in seeking new sources of revenue for the Organization. Perhaps consultant fees could be charged member governments for services rendered in connection with technical assistance and economic development activities. Or, better yet as a source of revenue, small fees might be collected for the United Nations on the issuance of passports or visas, on waterway tolls, or on mail going across national boundary lines. Such suggestions will, of course, meet with strong opposition on the part of those who are fearful of endowing the Organization with powers of a supra-national character; but unless member states begin to demonstrate a greater sense of fiscal responsibility than most of them have shown up to the present time, some drastic steps will have to be taken if the United Nations is to discharge its responsibilities in the difficult period ahead.

Basically, of course, the problem is more political than financial. So long as some countries cannot agree that activities such as those in the Gaza strip and the Congo are vital to the maintenance of peace, then we can expect recurring financial crises in the United Nations as bitter symptoms of the disease of mistrust and suspicion that still plagues the world.

Concluding Comment

The United States should continue to do what it can to improve its posture in the United Nations and to strengthen that Organization. The sad fact remains, however, that Soviet leaders are not interested in making the United Nations effective. They believe that a strong United Nations works against their interests and their determination to create a communist world. They want to be free to foment turmoil and confusion in various parts of the world without the restraining influence of an effective international organization.

At San Francisco the United Nations was built upon the assumption that the cooperation of the great powers which had worked together to win the war would continue in their joint efforts to keep the peace. Yet in the fifteen years that I have followed the activities of the Organization, I cannot recall a single instance when the Soviet Union enthusiastically supported one move to make the United Nations a stronger, more effective agency for world peace.

We have learned, over the years, that peace cannot be ushered in by a Charter, no matter how well conceived or how well drafted. But the choice before us, I think, is quite clear. Either we continue to move ahead with the United Nations toward a regime of order and stability under world law, or we begin to fall back down that slippery slope towards the point of no return where every state works solely for itself, and brute force is the final arbiter.

This somber fact confronts the smaller states particularly with a very grave challenge. It can be argued—although I think not too convincingly—that the United States could get along

without the United Nations. At least we are strong enough to stand on our own feet and defend ourselves. Certainly this is not true of the smaller nations. They need the protective umbrella of the United Nations—and the code of ethics which it encourages—for the preservation of their existence as independent states.

Peace with justice is the most important goal to which we can aspire. On that most of us can agree. But peace must have adequate foundations if it is to endure. One of these foundations is that nations must live by the principles of international law and order. Another is that they must settle their disputes by peaceful means. Still a third is the active awareness that human beings are entitled to more than mere subsistence.

The United Nations provides the main instrument available to the world for the attainment of these essentials of peace. It may not be perfect but it is the best the wit of man has been able to devise.

Of one thing I am certain: it is essential that we and the other free members of the United Nations never give up our quest for a just and lasting peace. We must never give in to despair; we must never permit ourselves to become fatalistic about the prospects of a nuclear war. Thucydides reminds us that fatalism tends to produce what it dreads, for men do not oppose that which they consider inevitable.

It follows that the smaller states have a great responsibility to give the United Nations the loyal support it needs to proceed with its task. This is, indeed, a case of mutual survival. If the smaller states will rise to the occasion and help make the United Nations a truly effective organization, we stand a good chance of having some semblance of peace in our lifetime.