Tape No. 17-2-2-88

ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW

with

William F. Quinn (WQ)

March 9, 1988

Honolulu, O'ahu

BY: Chris Conybeare (CC) and Daniel W. Tuttle, Jr. (DT)

Joy Chong: The following is an interview with William Quinn. It took place on March 9, 1988. It's a continuation of an interview which we did about a month prior to this. This is tape number six of the interview. We left off on tape number five in the prior interview.

CC: Governor, we're going to back up a little bit. I think we actually had you in office when we left off before, but one of the things we neglected, and I suppose no interview with you is quite complete without some discussion of that '59 campaign and your Second Mahele campaign, and . . .

WQ: Yes.

DT: . . . can you please tell me, where did that idea come from? Was that solely your thinking or did you have some prompting on that?

WQ: The idea of using the state lands to reach various social purposes, including the need for additional agricultural land and for farmers and homes, and that sort of thing, had developed over a long period of time with meetings over a year or more. I have to say that the name was entirely my own. And that was the biggest mistake of that whole campaign. (Chuckles) I was flying back from the Mainland, where I'd been in Washington, and I was reviewing a talk I was going to give on land policy in Maui. And it came to me that, by golly, this is really using the lands or distributing lands as best we can, in a fashion to meet certain social purposes and so forth, and was very much like Kamehameha III had done with the Great Mahele. And I know more about that now than I did then, or I would never have done that—use the name. I thought, well, this would be a good thing, so I called it that in that speech. And then I was stuck with it from there on. The other thing, though, that you may be referring to, was that there was some ads put out during that time, fifty bucks an acre thing. And that was prompted largely by people who were involved in the promotion and couple of those, I think, hit the press before I had even seen them. And Aku [Hal Lewis a.k.a. J. Akuhead Pupule] was very active in that.

DT: Yes, I was going to say, wasn't Aku the—he took credit, actually from various times, for having conceived the whole idea of the Second Mahele, and . . .

WQ: Well, he didn't invent the name, I wish I could blame him for it in the first place. And [in]

the second place, I would say that he took and ran with certain segments of it on the air, that fifty bucks an acre was one of them, but that was not the concept. And as you probably will remember, we did eventually get certain parts of the bill or bills passed. And I'll tell you another story about that in a minute.

We used the concept, for instance, when we had the volcano [eruption], and farmers [at Lālāmilo] were wiped out. We took state land, and we made that state land available on a drawing-by-lot basis. That's the key. That was the key because everything was being bid up so rapidly and the state had to auction off land, and so you couldn't make it available to the people you wanted to make it available to. And so the key of this whole thing was to make it available on a drawing-by-lot basis, at a fair value, which would not be increased by demand. And so we did it for the farmers there, for the people that were displaced, and we did it for the displaced businesses in the Hilo tidal wave, and then we did it for the Lālāmilo farm lands, and we did it several places, and it proved itself. But it was also a damning thing to me in the 1962 elections just because of that term more than anything else, and the fact of the—oh, yeah, give away thousands and thousands of acres of state land at fifty bucks an acre, and who's going to put in the streets and the sewers and so forth and so on.

CC: So it did come back to haunt you a little bit.

WQ: Oh, yeah. I think it was probably a major issue against me in 1962.

DT: And then along was Kealoha's defection probably, and . . .

WQ: Well, that was certainly quite an important, also.

DT: A second factor in '62.

WQ: And probably the most important of all—I think I could have survived either one of those two. But I think the most important of all, was that I had a considerable following on the neighbor islands from the union people. In 1959, the ILWU particularly, just didn't take me seriously, said, "He ain't got a chance, you know, not against Jack Burns." And so, if people on the neighbor islands wanted to support me, they supported me, and they had the signs up, and everything else, and I got a considerable vote on the neighbor islands from the union groups. But in 1962, those same people put their signs up, and they were torn down the first night they went up. And there was a very strong militant campaign against me which scared some of those people, and I think that was a major factor.

DT: You did very well in '59, too, in what you might call the enlarged or extended Kalihi, [O'ahu] area; whereas, in '62, you lost that.

WQ: Yes, now . . .

DT: It went back to the Democrats.

WQ: Well, yes. A certain amount of, I don't know whether it was just Kalihi, but I lost a lot of the Japanese vote that I had had. I'd campaigned very well in '59 in various areas that are predominantly voters of Japanese ancestry, and I did quite well. In '62, there was a strong effort in that respect, too, because Dan [Daniel K. Inouye] was running against Ben

[Benjamin] Dillingham, I think. It was readily apparent that Ben was not going to be any competition for Dan for the [U.S.] Senate seat. And so Dan and Matsy [Matsuo Takabuki] and Masato Doi and so forth, they just started going out in all these areas, you know, just really working hard. And if I saw one, I saw four or five people [who] had been strong supporters of mine in that particular community, who [later] came to me and literally said, one with tears in her eyes, "Well, I was so sure that you were going to win, but they were asking me to vote with them, you know. And so I said I would because I didn't feel it would make any difference in your campaign anyhow."

DT: Well, the Democrats also buried the hatchet in terms of their factional quarrels in '62.

WQ: That is correct. That is correct. When they got back Tom Gill and so forth, and they got the AFL-CIO faction behind them. I'd gotten it in '59, and then, I think, quickly lost it—or at least if I didn't lose it, I lost some of its strength in its support because the AFL leadership came to me and said, "Well, here's who we want you to appoint as [director] of labor [and industrial relations]."

And I said, "Well, I can't really hand away that."

And they said, "Well, you said you would."

"No, I said I want to listen to you and I would certainly want to have somebody appointed who would be acceptable to you and to the ILWU and all unions." But they felt that I owed them the right to name that person. And that had some effect, too, particularly among the leadership. And as you know, the leader [Robert Hasegawa] then, subsequently, became director of labor with Jack [Burns]. [Burns' first director of the department of labor and industrial relations in 1962 was Alfred Laureta. He later was succeeded by Hasegawa, who was tied to the AFL-CIO.]

DT: You also suffered some unfortunate publicity about, what's often remembered as a sort of a prison fiasco on the department of social services.

WQ: Oh, that was one of the toughest things I ever went through in my life. That was really difficult because [when] we started, of course, we put together all of those independent agencies and bureaus and everything into eighteen departments. And that meant we took the department of social services and department of institutions, for instance, and we put it together. This was under strong, strong advice by the consultants we had on the whole reorganization. But that meant that somebody had to be the boss. Mary Noonan had been a department head for quite a long time. The prison was part of [the department of] institutions. Joe [C.] Harper was the warden [of O'ahu Prison], but he had not had a department head's situation, [so] I put it together under Mary Noonan. And within three or four months, it was obvious that things were rocking, and rocking badly. And I couldn't quite put my finger on just what was happening.

I knew that Joe was very unhappy, and Mary seemed to be very distressed that her views were being honored in the breach as head of the department [of social services], and so I... George Chaplin told me about a fellow by the name of Ed [Edward P.] Shaw, who was a visiting professor [of labor and industrial relations and personnel] at the University [of Hawai'i], and that Ed, who was an economist, had also been very experienced in analyzing

some of the internal personnel problems in major departments. He had done such a thing for, I think it was one of the naval stations on the Mainland. And so I got in touch with Ed, and it seemed that he would be quite willing to do this as a consultant to me. We got to be good friends. Ed, unfortunately, died just about six weeks ago.

DT: Oh really?

WQ: Yeah, on the Mainland, living in San Antonio. But Ed was a bright guy. He retired out here, and we used to play some golf together, although he was much better than I. Ed completed his report [which included a survey of department staff] after some time, and he came in to review it with me before it was made public at all, and the conclusion on the last page was, Mary Noonan has to go.

Well, Mary Noonan had long preceded me in Republican politics and had been chairman of the Republican party the time I made my very first speech as a Republican. And she was, of course, the spokesman for the old wing of the party, and here I'm being told that the only real solution is to ask her to resign. Well, I talked to Ed as much as I could about that, but he said that's really it. And so I said already, all right. So Mary and I, I guess, had two meetings over two or three days, and the press had an inkling that something was happening, and they were all out there speculating. And Mary was alternately, extremely angry and in tears. And finally, I just said, "Well, this is what I have to do." So I did, but that was the grist for a great deal of newspaper stories, and not necessarily very favorable. It went on for quite a period of time.

DT: Yeah. It stayed on for a long period of time. I think you failed to mention, didn't she earlier fire Joe Harper from his position?

WQ: Yes, I think that's true.

DT: And then he tried to get his position back, . . .

WQ: That is correct.

DT: . . . ultimately had a long court battle, so it actually . . .

WQ: Well, even after she left . . .

DT: . . . dragged on long after . . .

WQ: . . . he was trying to get his position back.

DT: Long after your administration.

WQ: Yeah.

DT: Mm hmm.

CC: Actually, one of the major jobs you faced, despite problems like that, which were major problems, was the whole business of reorganizing what had been a territorial government and

fashioning a state government.

WQ: Ho, and the problems were not solved when I left the office. I mean, they were still in the process. But the very first one—I don't know whether we've talked about this before—but it is so unique. And I was reminded of it when we get into the advise and consent process with Bork, you know . . .

DT: Mm hmm.

WQ: . . . just not too long ago. But I probably told you, so stop me if I'm repeating myself. Tom Gill and Vince Esposito, and somebody else came to see me. Did I tell you that story? And they said that . . .

CC: Yes.

WQ: I think I did.

DT: Go ahead, go ahead.

WQ: Well at any rate, and they said, "Well, we think advise and consent means that we get to name our percentage."

And I said, "No, it doesn't."

Percentage—and so the first thing down was judges. And so they told me that they would not vote in favor of any of my appointees if I did not give them the right to name eleven twenty-fifths. Of course, I refused to do that. They voted against my appointees, and I lost some very good appointees. And that, to me, is unique in anything I've ever read in history, that at the beginning of statehood, at any time, a party would just say, "Well, we're just not going to vote for anybody, no matter what the qualifications are because we feel, politically, that we're entitled to something." I don't ever remember a senate doing anything like that.

Another phase, of course, was that we had to put all these departments together and it took maybe two years, because we had to get a reorganization bill. And then that bill had to be passed, and we had special sessions to pass that. But then, it had to be implemented. And this is in terms of letting some people go, changing the jobs of other people, changing the locations of people. And then some of those had to be further implemented by additional legislation. So that was a period that was going on, I think, some of it was still going on when I left office in 1962, although the concepts of reorganization had been adopted in the original reorganization bill, which we had presented to the legislature in a special session right after statehood.

One of the other things was that there was a number of laws that governed the territory, which were federal laws, and which went out of existence two years after statehood. And so there was a special emphasis to try to get such laws passed by the state, before we ended up without any laws. And I guess one of the most important of those was antitrust law because the federal antitrust law applied to territorial commerce. But when we became a state, it did not apply to state commerce as a [Department of] Interior matter. And of course, the federal law, since Hawai'i was so far away from the Mainland, had largely been honored in the

breach because [the] federal government didn't care what happened in the interior commerce of the territory of Hawai'i, and we had people [in] interlocking directorates who were all over the place, you know. And so the attorney general made a study of that and laid it all out and it was just astonishing the way the people in the major agricultural corporations also sat on the [boards of directors of] banks and also sat on the trust companies and sat on each other's boards. (Chuckles) Things of that nature, and so that was a major effort. And within that then, was the effort before we actually put this into place to get all these people, look, we are going to enforce this, and therefore, you had better attend and clean up your act. And that took quite a bit of time. Of course, in many cases, I was dealing with friends of mine who had been my supporters who were saying what the hell are you doing, you know. (Chuckles)

DT: Why did we put you in there? (Chuckles)

WQ: Yeah, just to do this. But it ended up that by the time we put the law in place, most of that had been cleaned up. In some cases, we had disputes with those who said, "No, it's perfectly all right for me to do this." It was only a threat of actually taking him to court that they finally agreed.

DT: Let's stop right there. You want to change tapes?

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

JC: And we're now on tape number seven, continuation of interview with William Quinn.

DT: All righty, I think right after the '62 election [in which WQ was defeated by Burns in the race for Governor], you moved, well, a passage of two or three years, you went into law practice and into the Dole Corporation . . .

WQ: That's correct.

DT: You don't go directly to Dole.

WQ: No, I was in the practice of law. I looked around for a bit, and I guess, the first of January of 1963, I'd joined what had been Moore, Torkildson and Rice, a law firm. Bud [Ernest Carroll] Moore, [Jr.] headed that law firm, and it became Quinn and Moore. And then I was there just about two years. And at that time, I got increasing pressure to see if I would take the job over at Dole that they'd been looking for somebody for about a year or so to take. They had a nationwide search, and they ended up with me, and so I took it.

DT: And then you sort of retired, but you must have still kept an eye on . . .

WQ: I didn't retire . . .

DT: . . . what was happening politically. You retired from politics, I'm saying.

WQ: Oh.

DT: Yeah. And you kept an eye on what was happening politically. Did it surprise you that Burns moved so rapidly to make peace with the business community? Here he'd been an ILWU

candidate and dyed-in-the-wool, and all of a sudden, I think he surprised even his party by the rapidity with which he moved to bring in, sort of rapprochement between the Downtown community and the ILWU and those factions.

WQ: No, I don't think that surprised me very much. Even in my day, you had almost an equal number on both sides as far as financial support is concerned. You know, the business community is not, and probably rightly so, motivated particularly by principle, political principle, you know. They're fairly expedient in that regard. And Jack was in power and he was willing to listen, and so they were quite eager to become part of it, I think.

DT: On balance, it was quite an astute political move, though, wasn't it, on his part?

WQ: Yeah, it was indeed, sure.

DT: Mm hmm. But you didn't stay out of politics completely, at least we were able to recruit your services. I say "we," the community, was able to recruit your services in the early 1970s to serve on the Honolulu Charter Commission.

WQ: That's right, that was my second charter commission.

DT: Yes. You'd served on the one . . .

WQ: Served on the original one.

DT: The original one back in '57 or '58, I believe.

WQ: Yeah. It started in '54.

DT: Yeah, but it didn't really get operating until, I think it was '57, because . . .

WQ: Yeah, because I left it in '56 when I ran for territorial senate and then I didn't go back to it. I went back to—I then became member of the statehood commission.

DT: I thought you'd gone back to it.

WQ: No.

DT: I may be mistaken, mm hmm.

WQ: But I did work on it. That was a long job, that first charter because I was with it about a year and a half, and it still was another year or more before it went [on] the ballot.

DT: Now, that was a result of the home rule . . .

WQ: That's correct.

DT: . . . passage in the territorial legislature.

WQ: That had passed.

DT: At any rate, you have any recollections? That charter [is] still in effect till this day, I believe, that you worked on.

WQ: I think there were some amendments that have been passed. In fact, there was a whole new charter commission, but they called it a charter review commission, and they tinkered here and there, but not a great deal.

DT: And nothing passed as a result of that. They have had a few individual . . .

WQ: Individual changes. Now that's right. It didn't—nothing passed.

DT: Yeah, the whole thing collapsed on itself.

WQ: Yeah, that's right. No, it's a—I think, and I speak now as a longtime official of the National Municipal League which concerns itself very much with charters. I think the Honolulu City Charter is an outstanding charter. The only thing that I would say is that if we were meeting today on some of the basic questions, such as, should Honolulu [have] a strong city mayor or not, I think, most of the consultants and I, myself, would go the other way. In 1955, when we were dealing with that question, and I think the public administration service and even the national, particularly, and the National Municipal League, were recommending that there be a mayor who would be sort of the honorary head of state, or head of city, and that there be a city manager who would be the professional to handle the day-to-day matters of sewers and roads and water and what have you. And we, on the charter commission, ended up opposing that with, I think, agreement from the consultants because we had the mayor of Honolulu as the chief officer that we elected. And we felt that that was important, that there be somebody like that, that people could vote for and would be their candidate and their person in office. But with statehood, I don't think we need that anymore, and I think we do have a lot of problems that come out of the relationship between city and state that are not necessarily that helpful to the growth of the state [of Hawai'i] and the city of Honolulu. And if I were to do it all over again, I might well call for a city manager.

DT: Yeah. Bob Dodge seemed to be of that opinion all the way through.

WQ: But Bob . . .

DT: Interestingly enough, because he'd been an old devotee of this National Municipal League.

WQ: That's right. See, he was—in fact, I'm on it today and I'm a member, I'm chairman of the All-America City Award jury. But I got on it originally when Bob Dodge said, "I'm going to leave it and I want somebody, and I would think that Bill Quinn would be the one."

DT: That's an interesting example, I think, of bipartisan, shall we say, cooperation.

WQ: That's right. But Bob was, you're quite right, and he had a graduate degree in municipal administration or something, and he was all for a managing director, no matter what. But most of us felt that since that was the highest [elective] political office we had, we ought to have a political campaign for it.

DT: You know, many people look upon that as one of your great contributions, in addition to

being the first governor. They look upon that, your contributions to that charter . . .

WQ: Well, I certainly look on that as something . . .

DT: Both times. Your . . .

WQ: . . . that I was very . . .

DT: . . . first time and then the latest time in the 1970s.

WQ: Yeah.

DT: But then you didn't stop quite there. You went one step further, and got back into politics, and I have to mention this (chuckles).

WQ: Sure, please do. Yeah, well we go to . . .

DT: Trying to [defeat] Sparky [Spark M.] Matsunaga.

WQ: Hiram Fong was quitting [in 1976]. And there was nobody to run for the Senate of the United States. And I certainly didn't want to, I'd only been with this firm, then, four years or something like that, four or five years. But you don't let a seat go by default, and there was nobody around. And so I had some polls taken. I had great name recognition, and everything else, you know, and it looked like the chances were there, except what I probably knew, but wouldn't totally face up to, was the fact that I'd been out for fourteen years, and Sparky'd been running every two years for twenty-two. [Matsunaga had been in the territorial house since 1954, and the U.S. House between 1962 and 1976.] (Chuckles) And that itself made a lot of difference. And so I started high and stayed right where I was, and didn't move a bit. (Chuckles) He passed me right by.

DT: Well, the polls, sometimes, are not as accurate as they might be, too. I think one of your problems, quite frankly, a personal opinion only, that you didn't have the name recognition that Sparky Matsunaga had. And it seems almost impossible for some of us to believe that, but in actuality, it really was true. A lot of people had forgotten that you had been the first governor . . .

WQ: Well, most of the polls said I had the name recognition. There was a lot of things that were, you know, just—oh, yeah, well I know the name Bill Quinn, and that sort of thing. Because wasn't all that long afterwards, but there were a lot of things—Second Mahele was used against me even then.

DT: Really?

WQ: Yeah, sure. And another thing that was used against me was, and this was a story made up out of whole cloth, but while I was in the practice of law, I had defended [the] son of [a Dole Corporation executive], who had a bad automobile accident, and his passenger was killed. He was charged with negligent homicide, which in those days, was a felony. And I remember I was called the night of the accident by [the executive] "Can you help me?"

Well, that wasn't generally my cup of tea, but I started talking to some other lawyers who might have been more in the criminal field, and I thought that maybe I better do this one myself. And so we did do the trial, and I did get him off. And then about four or five months later, I took the job at Dole. And the story was all around about a big payoff, and that sort of thing, you know. And that was damaging, and that was all where, I didn't even hear about that until after the election. It was all over the place by word of mouth.

DT: At any rate, it didn't work out, I guess.

WQ: It did not work out.

DT: Well, can we reflect just a little bit, Chris, do you think . . .

CC: Sure.

DT: . . . we should do a little bit of reflection?

CC: I think it would be good to do that. In fact, I was kind of interested to hear that—I thought that dirty campaigns were just invented last year.

(Laughter)

WQ: I think they'd been around as long as politics has been around. I've just been recently reading about the various speculation on the conviction of Socrates. It was back around even in those days, I guess.

DT: Probably the caveman had problems of the same sort.

(Laughter)

CC: But maybe we could look back and, of course, we've had a little discussion about the Burns administration, but following Burns, George Ariyoshi became governor, and I just wonder how you assess his terms in office. He was one of the folks that you said, broke with the Democrats, back when you were fighting some of those battles as governor. How do you assess . . .

WQ: Well, I say, with no modesty at all, that I think that Jack, and following him, George, put together one terrific, powerful group that were able to attain and retain and maintain power and control. But I think there were a great many things that should have been done that were not done, some of which were started in my days. And I guess, maybe in part because they were started in my day, they were treated like Eileen [Anderson, mayor of Honolulu] treated HART [Honolulu Area Rapid Transit] when she came in, get rid of it.

Like the whole Kona [Hawai'i] Plan, which should have been back then—bits and pieces were done over the next twelve or fourteen years, finally the new airport, then finally the road. And those things were part of a plan that was developed over [William] "Doc" Hill's vigorous objections in 1960 and '61, and they were part of a total plan and those capital improvements should have gone right ahead. This was one example.

DT: [Hill] very subsequently became quite a promoter . . .

WQ: That's right.

DT: . . . of the Kona Plan.

WQ: But that was ten years later.

DT: Mm hmm. Right, it was.

WQ: Yeah. And there are a number of other things. So I can't say—I can say that they were good, sound, solid people in office. I'd always liked both of them. But my own view is that with this young state, it was still a very young state, there was a lot of things that should have been done that weren't done.

DT: The feeling seems to abound in some corners that the Ariyoshi administration was more of a caretaker administration than being an innovative administration.

WQ: Well, that's the way it appears to me.

DT: Mm hmm. And so we come down to the present, I guess, unless you have something to interject, Chris.

CC: No, go ahead, Dan.

DT: You weren't given all the recognition that one might expect the first state governor would receive during [the] Burns and Ariyoshi years, but apparently, our new governor now, in [illegible] office a couple of years, [John] Waihee has turned to you for a little bit of advice. Is that true or is it just a line in a headline someplace?

WQ: No. I guess there were two lines. The first one was that I got a nice personal invitation to go to hear his inaugural address, which had never happened before, and so I went. And some reporters were asking me about that, "Yeah, this is the first time." So they made something of that in the press.

And then, the governor asked me to take this chairmanship of the advisory board on geothermal [i.e., chair of the Governor's Advisory Board on the Underwater Cable Transmission Project], which is a major, major project, if it can ever be accomplished. And so I've gotten heavily immersed in that, now, and have sort of become the spokesman. Just yesterday, we were over on the Big Island with the board—which is a blue ribbon board if you've ever had one—and took a helicopter ride over this whole area, and met with the executive committee of various Puna community associations. And I handled all their questions for an hour or so, and had lunch with them and came back. So I've sort of become the spokesman on that. It's a long way between now and the day there will ever be such a project, but it's a very exciting thing. It could be an enormous benefit to the state if it can ever be done.

DT: Can you really visualize that one of these days, electricity will be piped from the Big Island to O'ahu?

WQ: Everybody acknowledges it's feasible, Dan. It's been studied by a state-federal study commission since 1983 or ['8]4. And their study will be finished in 1990 or '91, but they've already designed the cable, and they've already laid out the areas of the water, I mean of the underground of the ocean, where it ought to be laid, and various things like that. We had a meeting in November with five international cable and electric companies of major proportions—one from Sweden, one from Norway, one, Pirelli, from Italy, and one from France, and one, Sumitomo, from Japan. And they want to go. They said we don't have to wait, and we know it can be done, but what the real problem is, how to get together a permitting process here in the state that doesn't take twenty-seven different permits with contested cases and this and that on each one. So it just is bureaucratically unable to go forward.

DT: Do you see this—not the present session of the legislature, but the next session of the legislature coming up—do you see the geothermal issue being one of the major ones that they have to face this next session?

WQ: Geothermal has been a major issue for the last two or three sessions. And they've made more and more steps to try to make it easier, including declaration of geothermal zones, no contested cases in certain areas, various things like that. Money available for research, and so forth. We proposed to the governor in an interim report, two bills. One to create an authority, which could then centralize all of this and act with a little bit more than an advisory board that isn't even confirmed by the senate, you know. And which would then try to bring all of these things together and then go out and maybe formulate the plans and ask these major, possible participants to make their proposals, because we're looking for mainly private enterprise to do this. That bill, I think, went in and didn't get much of a hearing.

CC: They had a hearing this session, now.

WQ: Senator [Richard M.] Matsuura came up in the first hearing, and boom, right back down. But the other one, the permitting bill, which names a lead agency and puts all the city and county and state permits, except health, all in one under the lead agency with a single permit to cover all aspects of it, with full public hearings, you know, whenever and wherever you have to have them—but one time.

DT: One time, mm hmm.

WQ: And also inviting the federal government to participate for the federal permits and everything. And that's alive and may well pass. And that would be a big step forward.

DT: Ultimately, however, we are probably going to have to come back to a government corporation, or something analogous to the TVA [Tennessee Valley Authority] here locally, a water authority, or a electrical authority.

WQ: Well, the [Hawaiian] Electric Company is opposed to that because they feel it's a step toward public power.

DT: Oh, I see.

WQ: And we think also, and with some good reason, that if there can be a consortia of companies

which, after some state money is spent, additional money for research and the private people over there now, spend their research to assure the resource is there in sufficient quantity to develop, say, 500 megawatts of power. That then, we think that could move forward and that the technique and capital and everything is there to deliver 500 megawatts to O'ahu, to be introduced into the grid.

DT: Right.

WQ: And that Hawaiian Electric would then buy it. And that they'd—and the projections that we got—some preliminary economic projections and so forth—which indicate that this could be a very profitable thing for investors.

DT: We are at the end of this tape, and I don't know if we want to . . .

JC: We're now going to tape number eight, the continuation of interview with William Quinn.

DT: Governor, during the heights of your—when you were governor of the state of Hawai'i, and also governor of the territory, where you had, what might be known as a competitive two-party system, from about 1955 to 1962, the Democratic party was on the upswing, the Republican party still had a reasonably well-organized entity, which had been extremely well organized back in the early [19]50s, operating. Yet today, we have virtually a shell of these two organizations. The Democrats, even though they were in control of state government, didn't really modernize their organization. And the Republicans, of course, became so discouraged after you left office. And then Hiram Fong, of course, as you've alluded to earlier, left office, and Neal Blaisdell—we might mention him—that they failed to contribute [funds]. And I guess, the Republican party today, in the state of Hawai'i, such as it is, is about $60[,000] or a $100,000 in debt. Do you have a reaction to this? You must have some feeling.

WQ: Yes, I do. And I think I probably have to take a portion of the blame on that. I could have done some things in a different way. But let me start this way. As you know, the Republican party had controlled things for fifty years, up to 1954. And when the Democrats took over the legislature in 1954, those Republicans that were around, were the same Republicans that had been around for quite some time. No new faces in there. In '56, I ran and was defeated for territorial senate. And in '56, I mean, I was about the only new face on the block, and as you probably will remember, I ran ahead of Joe Itagaki, and ran ahead of Mary K. Robinson in the primary and so forth. And then in the general, I ran way ahead of them.

~~DT: It was close, very close.~~

WQ: And almost beat Herb [Herbert K.H.] Lee. So then, I [eventually] get into office [as governor], and I'm conscious of two things. One, as a new state in '59, I felt that I wanted to give it as precedent, the best possible thing I could. And so on many boards and commissions, I gave it bipartisan, like I did the Supreme Court, you know. And right on through, circuit judges and all these others. I think, had I had the type of experience that Jack Burns had had and so forth, I probably would not have been thinking that idealistically for the benefit of the state. I'll set this pattern and people will follow it, type of thing. I would have taken all those Quinn Republicans and put them in every single position. And I think we'd probably still be there.

DT: (Chuckles) At least their descendants would still be there.

WQ: Yes. That's one thing. And then the other thing was, that I was aware of it in terms of political platforms and political policies and political achievements. And I was unable, just to give you an example, in, I don't know, '60, maybe in the first major legislative session after those five or six we had between '59 and February of '60. But at that time, we put together, through the Republican convention first, about an eighteen-point platform. And we had it adopted by the party. And then we put it through a whole legislative process. And we had the bills, one through twenty, the Republican program, and it was a good program. I mean, I would swear by it today, just because it was so good for the people. One of them was land [reform].

And the next thing was that when we—when the senate—when the legislature convened, bills one through twenty went from the administration down, together with all the talk I could give and everything else, but it went to Doc Hill, who had his own organization and his own empire; Pop [Julian R., Sr.] Yates, who had his own organization empire; Heb [D. Hebden] Porteus, and I could go on and on and on. And it got down there, and instead of being, here's the Republican program, one through twenty and let's go, and let's really ride it, and let's make it that which will get the recognition and so forth, one bill went in as bill number eight, another one went in as bill twenty-eight, another one in at forty-five, and so forth, then it lost its entire identity. And that, also, I think, is a major reason why the Republican party didn't come off any stronger than it did in those few years that I was there.

I was, as you know, considered a—oh, I don't know what you call it, the word escapes me, but I was an accident. That's what they—the Democrats thought so, and I think the Republicans probably did, too. I was elected. The Democrats still had full control of the house. I did carry a slight majority of Republicans with me for those three years. And as you know, from the appointment standpoint, too, I lost a number of appointments just because I couldn't even hold those thirteen Republicans together. If Randy Crossley wanted to quit, boom, I'd lose something. And so it went. But I think those are a couple of straight political things that gave rise to it.

Then when I was defeated, and I remember in 1964, in the early days, I happen to have been vocal on behalf of Nelson Rockefeller [candidate for Republican nomination for U.S. president], but I was more vocal on behalf of a unified party here. And I made speeches on unification all over the state in that year of late 1963 and early '64, I guess. And of course, Barry [Goldwater] was the big man on the other side, and Barry was considerably more to the right than I was. But didn't make any difference. You know, we're Republicans first, and we'll select a candidate and we'll all back 'em.

And then a bunch of—as we went along—a bunch of Mainland Republicans from the Goldwater group came down here and just started working, and first of all, just keep this guy Quinn from even going to the convention. I mean, the state convention even, you know. And they were really working hard. And it was about that time, that they say to me, "Well, come take this job and eventually be president of Dole." And then at that time, it's going to be—and then [eventually] you'll be president of Castle & Cooke, you know. And I thought well, that looks like a good alternative future, but they were saying, "If you do this, we've gotta ask you not to be quite that active in politics for a while." And so I think maybe that impacted me, somewhat, as far as getting out, and that left some void in leadership. And I

think I'm responsible for that, too.

DT: Well, certainly it happened. Still happening in terms of recent—the [Pat] Robertson effort to take over. The factionalism . . .

WQ: Yes, exactly.

DT: Sort of, hurts the party any way you look at it, but the fact is it has now persisted for twenty-five years, shall we say.

WQ: No new leadership has come up.

DT: Makes it tough. Would you care to speculate? Maybe you choose to not answer this question. Why have the Democrats been so lax about their party organization?

WQ: Yeah, I can speculate about that and I think it's like a repeat, almost exactly of what the Republicans did after fifty years in office. What the Democrats are doing after thirty-five years in office; and that is, soon as the people get in power, they want to hold on [to] that power, they don't want to build anything, they don't want to pass anything along. They've got theirs. And that's been the case. The Democrats have become fat and happy in office, and they don't want to see that change, and they're not interested in building a political party if the individuals are—and you look at some of the individuals. They're there now, and they were there then. Then, they were young, vigorous, idealistic guys, and now they're cigar-smoking people, sitting back and saying, "I've got mine."

DT: In other words, human nature changes very slowly.

WQ: Very slowly and very little. And in that connection, whether they have a strong political party or not, doesn't affect them that much, so long as they're in office, or have the power.

DT: And so it goes with politics.

WQ: And so it goes.

DT: I don't think I have anything more to say.

CC: No, I guess, no, I think that's. . . .

DT: We thank you . . .

CC: Start with politics and end with politics.

DT: We thank you very, very much.

END OF INTERVIEW