Interview
JOHN WHITEHEAD
December 18, 2005
Tape 1

(shot 1)

QUESTION: **0:55** John, I know your book [UNINTELLIGIBLE] begins in 1898 with the Hawaiian statehood and Alaskan statehood movement. But we're gonna talk about 1854, the first attempt at statehood, or at least—and Jonathan [UNINTELLIGIBLE] saying that he thought that there would be statehood, and then Hawaii wanted to be a state, the 1903 legislative decision, 1919 and 1920 Kuhio [UNINTELLIGIBLE] trying to get legislation for statehood. Any thoughts on the early statehood movement?

WHITEHEAD: **1:30** Well, the—the earliest attempt was this Royal Treaty that was negotiated between the United States and the Kingdom of Hawaii in 1853, 54 to annex Hawaii um, as a state. And before the Treaty, which was written and signed, could go to the Senate for ratification, Kamehameha III died. And so the issue ended. But ever since then, people have wondered what would have happened, had that Treaty gone to the Senate um, for uh, ratification. Well, of course, no one knows. But the 1850s was the decade of the greatest American expansion in the Pacific uh, that there ever was. San Francisco had just emerged as a great Pacific port in about two or three years after the Gold Rush. Uh, also at the same time, Commodore Perry sailed into Tokyo Bay and demanded that Japan be opened to trade with America. Uh, Senators from California started negotiating with the uh, Russian Minister in Washington to buy Alaska. **2:30** So uh, it was a time when expansion into the Pacific uh, was very much a national concern. Uh, would the Treaty have been ratified? Uh, some people have speculated um, Oh, would the Senate have approved uh, bringing in uh, a state that might have sent Hawaiian Senators uh, to the Congress. Who knows how the Senate might have reacted to that. Some people say, well, race would have been an issue. On the other hand, Senators are capable of saying, well, the Hawaiians would have been from Hawaii ... not from Alabama. Uh, so as long as they're from Hawaii, that would be okay. We know there was great support from California, uh, and also, there was support from Maine and Massachusetts. Because the whaling industry was at its peak in the 1850s, and those states were very much involved uh, in—in their interest in the Pacific. So uh, it—it could have well been a possibility in the 1850s.

(shot 2)

QUESTION: **3:28** What about, I guess, the first Territorial Governor, Dole, asking for—talking about the possibility of Hawaii becoming a state? Was that for real?

WHITEHEAD: **3:45** B—by the 18 ... uh, actually, annexation, uh, I would say that the—the possibilities for Hawaii becoming a state uh, probably were not right—because there had been quite a lot of controversy in the Senate over annexing Hawaii. You know, it—it was only taken in by a joint resolution of Congress, not a two-thirds vote in the Senate, because there were—there was a substantial opposition uh, to the annexation, so uh, within—within the Senate, as well as with—from the Native Hawaiians. So I think probably by 1898, uh, it was sort of here and no further. Uh, Hawaii was going to be a territory. **4:27** Um, by 1908, there were some cases in the US Supreme Court called the Insular Cases that did determine that Hawaii and Alaska were territories that could become states, whereas the Philippines was not. Uh, so there was always the possibility for statehood from those early days uh, after annexation. But the—the interest of the nation simply uh, wasn't there from the mainland standpoint. And from the standpoint of Hawaii uh, the—the revolutionaries had in a way gotten what they wanted in overthrowing the Kingdom. So at least for that moment in time, as long as the Congress did not intervene in the actions of the territory, I think they were satisfied uh, for the time.

QUESTION: **5:20** And this had something to do, of course, with—a lot to do with the sugar industry.

WHITEHEAD: With sugar.

QUESTION: Right.

WHITEHEAD: **5:25** Uh, and by the time uh, by—by the time the annexation uh, took place then, it appeared that a territory was going to have the same tariffs uh, or uh, privileges with the import of sugar uh, that domestic sugar would have.

(shot 3)

QUESTION: **5:41** What about Prince Kuhio? He's sometimes given credit for [UNINTELLIGIBLE] statehood for Hawaii [UNINTELLIGIBLE] legislation in the 1920s. Where do you see his role in the statehood [UNINTELLIGIBLE]?

WHITEHEAD: **5:58** Well, um, a—as we know, one of the issues with Prince Kuhio was that he made a deal. Uh, we—we're told this; I've never seen documentation. That he made a deal with one of the Baldwins at the Pacific Club uh, that he would not try to overthrow the territory, as there was fear that Robert Wilcox might. Uh, and in exchange, he would be the Delegate, and Hawaiians would be given uh, many bureaucratic posts within the territory. Um, from what I can gather, Kuhio always hoped that a Hawaiian could be governor of the territory or of the state. Uh, and I think probably Kuhio uh, would have backed statehood uh, with a hope that—that a Hawaiian would be elected governor uh, of the new state. **6:50** Uh, but I think uh, practically, there simply was not enough support either within Hawaii from the dominant economic [UNINTELLIGIBLE] or within the nation, uh, to bring Hawaii into the Union uh, in the 1920s.

(shot 4)

QUESTION: **7:04** And Lorrin Thurston, who was first very much involved in the overthrow of the Kingdom, he had a famous statement in 1927 about statehood for Hawaii. Could you talk about that a little bit?

WHITEHEAD: **7:21** Uh, yeah; in 1927, Lorrin Thurston um, then still the publisher of the Advertiser, uh, who had been the leader of the revolution in 1893, uh, se—seemed to be quite happy with the status quo in Hawaii. Uh, sugar was fine. Um, and—and we're always told that the old Haoles were a little bit worried about what would happen if there were more elected offices in the territory. **7:47** They felt confident of controlling the appointment of the governor, who by the Organic Act had to be a resident of the islands. So I think—well, by the 1920s, Thurston was an older man, uh, and I think probably Thurston's main impulse was uh, for the rest of the my life we really don't need any more change, because change brings uncertainty, um, and why deal with uncertainty if you don't have to.

QUESTION: **8:15** What was his statement?

WHITEHEAD: He said, Hawaii needs statehood like a cat needs two tails.

(shot 5)

QUESTION: **8:24** But then all of this begins to change in the 1930s. What were the events that launched the modern statehood movement in Hawaii?

WHITEHEAD: **8:34** Well, the [UNINTELLIGIBLE] event that rocks the statehood movement, in my mind, was the famous Massey case uh, of uh, 1931, 32. Um, and the—the—what really happened with the Massey case was unbelievable to the mainland. Uh, a jury in Hawaii convicted a White woman of the murder of non-White island—uh, as they called them, island boys. Uh, no one believed this could ever happen in the racial climate of the 1930s. Uh, Mrs. Fortesque was defended by America's leading lawyer, Clarence Darrow. Uh, he couldn't comprehend what had happened. Well, once Mrs. Fortesque was uh, convicted, sentenced to ten years in hard—in hard labor, enormous pressure was put on the Territorial Governor by many members of Congress, by most mainland newspapers, calling this conviction an outrage and demanding that um, that Lawrence Judd pardon Mrs. Fortesque. **9:46** Uh, and there was quite a lot of talk uh, by members of Congress uh, that Hawaii was not fit for self-rule, and that the territorial status would be taken away, uh, and Hawaii would be put under a military commission. The commander of the Navy, Yates Sterling, demanded this, uh, a Senate—uh, a Senator uh, from Connecticut, Hiram Bingham, the grandson of the original missionary to Hawaii, and Bingham had been born in Hawaii, he proposed that Hawaii be put under a military commission. As did Congressman Rankin of Mississippi. Uh, and so uh, Judd commuted the sentence of the Fortesques, uh, which still meant that Mrs. Fortesque was guilty, to one hour served in his office uh, and then they went back to the mainland. **10:39** There was a great outcry in Hawaii about this. But there was also a real fear uh, that Hawaii would be put under a military government. Uh, then FDR was no friend of Japanese, and when he was elected in '32, he fully supported this Rankin bill which was introduced into Congress in 1933, um, which would have uh, removed the—the—the—the stipulation that the governor be an island resident. Uh, there had been a report by the US Attorney General a year before called the Richardson Report that was investigating law and order in the islands. And though it didn't call for a military government, it did call for a federally-appointed Attorney General, and that the governor could be appointed from the mainland. So then for the first time, the old Haoles um, concluded, well gosh, maybe we're not safe with the Congress. We thought they were just like us. **11:45** But now if they're going to come out here uh, and take away self-government, uh, maybe statehood is what we need. Because uh, they can't do that to a state; they can only do it to a territory. Well, just as the Legislature uh, started uh—it created something called a uh, Hawaii Legislative

Committee to oppose the Richardson Report. Uh, Joseph Farrington was the secretary of that commission. Uh, and then just as they were responding to the Rankin bill uh, and to uh, the Richardson Report, then in 1932 the Congress discriminated against Hawaiian sugar. Well, discriminating against people was one thing, but discriminating against sugar uh, was a completely different matter. Uh, and this was the same Jones Constigan Act, um, which um ... it—it relieved certain duties on mainland sugar, which it didn't relieve on Hawaiian sugar. **12:50** Uh, and then this was taken to court um, at which point the courts ruled that though Hawaii was a territory and a part of the United States, that Congress could make laws for a territory that weren't the same as the laws for a state. Well, this was when uh, the—the so-called Big Five—uh, and no one ever knew who spoke for the Big Five, uh, but this is when the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association uh, supported statehood. Uh, and then in 19—the elections of 1934 uh, Sam King was elected Delegate. Uh, and so he went to Washington in '35 with a statehood bill that had the full support of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association. **13:40** So it was when the Congress started intervening and discriminating against the territory that the—whatever you want to call it, the political power structure or the economic oligarchy then became concerned uh, that their interests weren't going to be served uh, by simply uh, sitting in Hawaii and hoping that the Congress would leave it alone. That—that was often the—the view that the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association had uh, almost an embassy in Washington and gave elegant parties uh, and bringing in, you know, the ukuleles and leis would convince Congressmen to leave Hawaii alone. But uh, by 1935, there was clearly a sense that the Congress would not leave Hawaii alone.

(shot 6)

QUESTION: **14:30** Just a couple of follow up questions—

WHITEHEAD: Okay.

QUESTION: --in regard to that. [UNINTELLIGIBLE] if I'm not mistaken, introduced a bill in 1931. He was the Republican Delegate to Congress.

WHITEHEAD: Yes.

QUESTION: **14:46** But was there some feeling that the ... was there some foreboding that this kind of discrimination was on the way, or was there

a feeling because of the Depression that statehood would help, or do you have any idea what that was about?

WHITEHEAD: **15:01** Okay; '31 ... 1931, the verdict in the Massey case had not come down yet. So things were not as um, uh, a—as—as heightened with the fear of the Congress retaliating on the Congress in '31. Uh, then in '31, Lincoln McCandless was elected Delegate uh, and seemed to be fairly ineffectual—

QUESTION: **15:27** But he—

WHITEHEAD: --in the Congress.

QUESTION: --introduced a bill in '34—

WHITEHEAD: Yeah.

QUESTION: --if I'm not mistaken, right?

WHITEHEAD: **15:30** I think there were several statehood bills. Uh, but um, there—there's no sense that McCandless then had the support of the Big Five. And everything sort of came to a head in the election of '34.

QUESTION: **15:43** With Massey and with the Jones Constigan Act.

WHITEHEAD: Yes; yes.

QUESTION: Between the two of them.

WHITEHEAD: **15:48** Yeah. Uh, in—in—in fact, uh, there was a deal made with the Department of Agriculture that left Hawaii sugar alone. Uh, so sugar was not threatened, except the islands were now concerned that uh, the—the—the Congress won't leave us alone; we—we got off this time, but next time who knows what kind of bill they could pass—

QUESTION: Is it '33—

WHITEHEAD: --about Hawaii.

QUESTION: **16:12** --that after that, from '34 on and the [UNINTELLIGIBLE] and so forth that the sugar planters and the economic oligarchy was supportive of statehood from that point on, in your mind?

WHITEHEAD: **16:26** Well, as far as we can find, the—the—the Big Five—and no one knows who the Big Five was, except that—we know the firms, but we don't know who spoke for them, except the Hawaiian—Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association. Uh, they seemed to have been for statehood. Of course, Walter Dillingham always opposed statehood, but then he wasn't one of the Big Five.

(shot 7)

QUESTION: **16:51** From 1935 until—between 1935 and 1938, there were [UNINTELLIGIBLE] Congressional hearings on statehood. Why were there so many? Why did it take so long to make a decision about whether Hawaii was read for statehood or not ready for statehood?

WHITEHEAD: **17:10** Um, okay; between—between '35 and '58, there were twenty. Between—between '35 and '38, there were two hearings. Uh, one in '35 and on in '37. And that was the first time a Congressional Committee had come to Hawaii. Uh, in those two hearings, um, first most Congressmen were convinced that Hawaii was a mature economic and political entity. Um, but there was still—this is the 1930s—uh, there was substantial mainland uh, prejudice against uh, uh, Asians, both—both Japanese Americans and Chinese Americans. And so that clearly was on the minds of many Congressmen. Uh, islanders, uh, including members of the Big Five. Charles Hemmenway, the vice president of Alexander & Baldwin, who was a regent of the University, testified to Congress that there was no loyalty issue with the Japanese Americans. **18:11** That he knew these uh, students in the University of Hawaii, and in fact, uh, America would show um ... its appreciation of democracy by making Hawaii a state. But the Congressmen uh, were—uh, this was their first interaction with Hawaii's uh, multiracial population. Uh, then another committee came in '37 uh, by which time uh, uh, Hawaii was even building up more as the arsenal of the Pacific uh, and war clouds were rising uh, with uh, with Japan. **18:49** Uh, but the '37 uh, committee hearing said that Hawaii had passed every test that could be required of a territory to become a state, uh, but that uh ... the Congress would now like a plebiscite from Hawaii to see if the people of Hawaii wanted statehood. Well, by the time that report was issued, uh, sometime in '38, the next general election would have been 1940. **19:18** And so a plebiscite was

put on the ballot of the general election in 1940, uh, which passed two to one in favor of statehood. Um, so that's where the Congress stood um ... in 19—uh, in 1940. But by 1940, war clouds were really emerging on the—in the Pacific. So um, so the—the question of statehood was really put in abeyance uh, until the war issue was resolved.

(shot 8)

QUESTION: **19:48** Do you know anything about the two to one plebiscite vote? Did we [UNINTELLIGIBLE].

WHITEHEAD: **20:01** Um, in—in all of the—in all of the plebiscites uh, that ... we don't have as much information on that one, to my knowledge, as we do on the later on in '58. But the—the groups that always seemed to be the most in favor of statehood uh, by—by numerical numbers would have been the—the Japanese Americans. Because state—statehood would bring democracy, it was thought, more to them. Uh ... the business interests, the younger business interests seemed to be in support of statehood. **20:32** Um, it was always thought that older Haoles were uh, a substantial part of the vote against statehood, and some Hawaiians. Uh, particularly older Hawaiians who remembered the Monarchy, who were alive in the days of the Monarchy. Uh, some younger Hawaiians saw that statehood might—might be a way uh, out of dominance from the Big Five uh and the Republican Party.

(shot 9)

QUESTION: **21:02** Have you looked at the [UNINTELLIGIBLE] in 1935 and 1937, and the time that Congress was here and what seemed to be their knowledge of Hawaii? What attitude did they seem to evidence in those committee hearings [UNINTELLIGIBLE]?

WHITEHEAD: **21:26** Um, in the hearings, uh, some of the Southern members of Congress did make ... what we would call today racist statements about, well, if we ma—we—if we admit Hawaii, we're going to have a Japanese or a Chinese Senator in the Congress. So there was that level of reaction. Uh, also, even some local people thought, oh, but the Congressmen will be snowed uh, by the uh, politically powerful people, that you'll get a—you'll get a group of Congressmen coming to Hawaii and, well, they'd be piled with leis and taken to a luau uh, and being—be given food and drink and be so charmed, they would go home thinking everything was perfect and let's vote for Hawaii. **22:09** So it was—it was a little bit of both. Um, that they

were charmed and overwhelmed, uh, but then there was that—there was that undertone, particularly from Southern uh—this Congressman Rankin from Mississippi, uh, was a member uh, of the—of those committees that came over, which was the—the Insular and—um, Interior and Insular Affairs Committee. Uh, and—and there was that racist un—undertone from the Southerners of … of what an elected delegation to the Congress might look like.

(shot 10)

QUESTION: **22:44** You said that by 1940, 1941 war clouds had sort of taken the whole statehood issue off the table, but what about the war? What about the role that the war played in the statehood movement [UNINTELLIGIBLE]?

WHITEHEAD: **23:00** Uh, th—the—the war played the movement in the statehood movement, because suddenly American mainlanders knew about Hawaii. Um, in—in 1940, a poll conducted by Fortune Magazine revealed that Americans would rather defend Canada than Hawaii. There was that little appreciation of Hawaii's connection to the mainland. Uh, but then of course, with the bombing of Pearl Harbor, instantly every American knew about Pearl Harbor. This was not some uh, island where rich people sailed for a vacation and uh, you heard some ukulele music on the radio. Uh, this was now real. And then of course, during the war, um, there were literally millions … of Americans who came to Hawaii. **23:58** Um, we—we have the statistics that over a million servicemen came through Hawaii with the Army. Uh, the Navy doesn't know how to count, because they don't know whether to count people who were just shore-based or shore-based and sea-based. Uh, but we can imagine that there were at least as many people who came through with the Navy as with the Army. So that's two million people. Um, there were four hundred thousand civilian workers who came to Hawaii during the war. **24:32** Uh, and there's always this statistic I like to quote; um, the USO reported sixty million individual visits to USO socials. So if you—if you sort of figure how many times a military person went to a USO event, and divide that into sixty million, uh, then that's the number of servicemen and women uh, who came through Hawaii during the war. Uh, it just created an enormous uh, recognition factor. Everyone knew about Hawaii after the war.

QUESTION: **25:07** And goodwill, I imagine. I mean, [UNINTELLIGIBLE] that many American [UNINTELLIGIBLE] from Wahiawa and [UNINTELLIGIBLE].

WHITEHEAD: **25:20** Uh, yeah. Of course—of course, there's a—uh, there were—there were as many reactions to being in Hawaii during the war as there were people who came. Uh, there was fantastic overcrowding, and as you know, there was a curfew. So there were no moonlit nights on the beaches. Uh, you were inside with the—with the drapes pulled down, uh, Waikiki was under barbed wire, um, going Downtown was—was a crowd scene. Uh, on the other hand, um … uh, many service personnel, particularly officers, uh, took part in the Honolulu Symphony, the Honolulu Academy of Fine Arts. Uh, Walter Dillingham and his wife, uh, entertained officers up at La Pietra. **26:04** So uh, there were many reactions uh, to Hawaii. But uh, the—an—and then of course, looking at it the other way, uh, the 100th and the 442nd Regimental Combat Team uh, created enormous uh, uh, favorable publicity to the loyalty of islanders to the nation. Of course, Harry Truman received the 442nd at the White House uh, in 1946. So uh, uh, statehood was very much seen right after the war as something Hawaii deserved.

(shot 11)

QUESTION: **26:42** Would you say a little bit more about what the 100th and the 442nd did in [UNINTELLIGIBLE] and how that helped [UNINTELLIGIBLE] the loyalty issue?

WHITEHEAD: **26:57** Well, uh, maybe start a little bit earlier. One of the very interesting things that took place in Hawaii—of course, from a negative sense, Hawaii was put under martial law. Uh, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, the general, uh, then became the military governor of Hawaii. Uh, and the man who served in that role the longest was General Delos Emmons. And he made a momentous decision for Hawaii uh, in early 1942. Uh, of course, we all know that on the West Coast, uh, uh, Executive Order 9066 issued by Franklin Roosevelt led to the relocation of all Japanese and Japanese Americans on the West Coast to relocation camps. In Hawaii, you know, a number of Japanese and Japanese Americans had been arrested for supposed charges of disloyalty or uh, uh, in uh, late '41, early '42. **28:00** And so about a total of fourteen hundred Japanese or Japanese Americans were interned, and some on the mainland. But Emmons refused to obey um, uh, Roosevelt's direct order to relocate the Japanese. The local business community in Honolulu, men such as Charles Hemmenway, even Walter Dillingham, uh, the Council of Interracial Unity, said to Emmons, We don't want this in Hawaii. These are our people, uh, and they're loyal. And so Emmons did not relocate the population of uh, of Japanese Americans. Well,

there was a strange thing; uh, about half of all draftees in Hawaii from '40 to '42 were Japanese Americans. Uh, Japanese Americans had been commissioned at the University of Hawaii ROTC uh, as commissioned officers in the Army of the United States. **29:00** Well, what's the Army of the United States now going to say? Uh, you were good enough to be commissioned three months ago, but now you're a loyalty risk? And so Emmons faced the issue of what should we do with these Japanese Americans who are already uh, commissioned into the Army of the United States. Uh, and so the Hawaii National Guard, of which Spark Matsunaga uh, was a member, uh, was turned around into the 100th Infantry Battalion, and sent to Europe. Now, there was actually an issue of what to do with Japanese Americans in uniform. I mean, what would have happened if there had been a Japanese land invasion of Hawaii in early 1942? Uh, would the Japanese first have shot at ... Japanese Americans in uniform? That was a real uh, question people asked. **30:00** So—so Emmons' thought was uh, Let's form a battalion uh, and send them to Europe. And so uh, the—the 100th was sent to Europe. Well, first to Wisconsin for training, then of all places, to Mississippi uh, for training; Camp Shelby in Hattiesburg, Mississippi. Well, then the 100th was gone, but then when many Japanese Americans were—like Dan Inouye were—were given a—I think it was a 4C status, aliens ineligible for service, well this was quite—this was quite an insult. Uh, well, you drafted my brother—uh, well, not that specific case, but what many Japanese Americans would have said. You drafted my brother a year ago, now you're calling me an enemy alien. Um, and so Emmons thought uh, with the—with the help of uh, people in Washington, uh, what should we do now? **31: 00** Uh, and then I think it's—is it late '42, early '43 that the concept of um, a—a volunteer uh, battalion of Japanese Americans uh, was launched uh, with again support from the ha—uh, business community of Honolulu, General Emmons, um, and Defense Department officials in Washington. And so that—that was the call for volunteers uh, both from Hawaii and on the mainland. And at first, it was thought that the bulk would come from the mainland. But the volunteers were so overwhelming from Hawaii ... that uh, it became a dominantly Hawaii uh, force. And so um, um, the veterans were recruited, and I guess you know the—the story that um ... Dan Inouye was told he couldn't join, that he was supposed to stay in medical school and become a doctor. **32:00** But he resigned from medical school uh, and enlisted, and I think was something like number two thousand four hundred and ninety of the twenty-five hundred uh, who were selected. And so uh, the 442nd um, was then sent uh, to Camp Shelby to um, uh, join the 100th. And you know, there are all sorts of strange stories from the South at this time that the Japanese Americans were made honorary Caucasians, which they didn't

accept as flattery. And they would do such things as sit in the back of the bus uh, to show their solidarity with the Blacks of uh, Mississippi. But uh, uh, but both groups, the 100th and the 442nd seemed to thrive in Mississippi. Uh, they were trained, they were then shipped uh, to Europe. Uh, the 100th got there first. Uh, they participated in a number of major uh, land invasions in Italy, I think the battle of Anzio. **33:02** Um, then when the two units were joined, uh, they were all c—collectively called the 442nd. Though the 100th uh, did keep some of it's um ... separate identity uh, with uh, slogans and mottos. And then the—the famous ... uh, the—the famous incident for which they became most um, most renowned was the so-called rescue of the Lost Battalion, which was a Texas National Guard uh, unit which had been surrounded by the Germans um, in uh, was it northwest France or northwest Germany?

QUESTION: France.

WHITEHEAD: **33:44** France. Uh, and so the 442nd saved them. Uh, and they became very famous, though at first the Texans didn't necessarily return ... the compliment of being all for Hawaii's statehood. Um, but that was how they became particularly famous, and as you probably know, there was a movie uh, done in 1952 called Go For Broke. Uh, Go For Broke was the motto of the 442nd and um ... Van Johnson played a—a Caucasian Army officer who was in charge uh, of the Japanese American soldiers, and finally when another uh, Caucasian American made insinuations about the Japanese Americans, then there was uh, a fist fight in which Van Johnson beats up the ... the uh, the other guy. And so this was—but it—it's a great movie, Go For Broke, if you've never seen it. **34:38** Uh ... uh, the—the—the bottom result of this was that the 442nd was uh, the most decorated battalion in the history of World War II. General Mark Clark called it the bravest batta—uh, uh, battalion in—in World War II. Uh, there were uh, literally hundreds of Purple Hearts; that's why it was called the Purple Heart Battalion. Actually, there was only, I believe, one Medal of Honor winner ... uh, at the time, but then uh, about five years ago, all of the records of the 442nd were reviewed, and twenty—uh, I believe it was twenty additional Congressional Medal of Honor were—were awarded. So uh, it was—it was quite well known.

QUESTION: **35:28** [UNINTELLIGIBLE]

WHITEHEAD: Okay.

QUESTION: [UNINTELLIGIBLE]

WHITEHEAD: [UNINTELLIGIBLE]

(shot 12)

QUESTION: [UNINTELLIGIBLE] You were talking about World War II.

WHITEHEAD: M-hm.

QUESTION: **35:49** [UNINTELLIGIBLE] said the military during wartime is a great lover; there is no class distinction [UNINTELLIGIBLE]. I wonder if you would respond to that, not just from a World War II point of view, though [UNINTELLIGIBLE] there is no class distinction [UNINTELLIGIBLE]. Is that part of [UNINTELLIGIBLE] in your mind [UNINTELLIGIBLE]?

WHITEHEAD: **36:25** Um ... I—I ... well, of course, in all wars, uh, people advance very rapidly. Uh, people who enter as privates end up as officers, but uh, that's the nature of wartime service. Uh, and I—and I—and I think it's true that—that in wartime, bravery is not based on who your family was, or where you went to school. Uh, it—it's based on what you do. Uh, and I think in—in civilian life, oftentimes what you can achieve is based ... or it certainly was in the 30s on who your family was or where you went to high school, or where you went to college. Uh, but in wartime, uh, all of that vanishes. Uh, and—and—and the other thing uh, that really was significant with World War II was that so many people in Hawaii were then participating in this national cause. Uh, they were getting national recognition. And as—as you know, in Journey to Washington, Senator Inouye always notes that it had never really dawned on him that he could aspire to national status, to a role in the national government. **37:37** And that one of the things that leaving Hawaii and going to Europe, and meeting new people uh, when he came back, he said, You know, I—I don't have to be ... just a doctor in Hawaii, which he couldn't be anymore because he lost his arm, but um, we can aspire to national status. Spark Matsunaga told me the same thing. Uh, that—that—that we can be a part of the national political system; uh, we're not just limited to Hawaii. And I think that's what World War II did to people living in Hawaii. For people living in the mainland, it told them uh, what the values uh, of—uh, of the people of Hawaii were.

(shot 13)

QUESTION: I want to go back—

WHITEHEAD: It gave them publicity.

QUESTION: **38:25** I want to go back to that [UNINTELLIGIBLE] think. I mean, there are others too, other—

WHITEHEAD: M-hm.

QUESTION: A guy like Bill Richardson as uh—

WHITEHEAD: M-hm.

QUESTION: He will serve—I think he [UNINTELLIGIBLE] served but it wasn't in Europe. [UNINTELLIGIBLE]

WHITEHEAD: M-hm, m-hm.

QUESTION: [UNINTELLIGIBLE]

WHITEHEAD: M-hm.

QUESTION: Inouye becomes a captain.

WHITEHEAD: M-hm.

QUESTION: [UNINTELLIGIBLE]

WHITEHEAD: **38:48** I think one of the interesting things … uh, whe—when we think of Japanese Americans, we always think of the 100th and the 442nd. But some of the interesting things for me is that a lot of the guys in the 442nd were sort of … sort of the rough and tumble plantation kids who played sports. If you were really brainy, like at McKinley High School, uh, you didn't go in the 442nd; you were lateralled out into the Military Intelligence Service where, as folks say, uh, the Army had some delusion we knew how to speak Japanese. **39:24** Uh, and so they were gonna train us uh, to decipher messages in um … in—in—in Japanese. I think uh, George Ariyoshi was in MIS. Uh, and then there was another fellow uh, named uh, Ted Tsukiyama uh, who was originally in the 100th, and then was lateralled into MIS. And so it was sort of funny that the guys who had done best in

school ended up not getting the fame and praise uh, and the Purple Hearts coming back from Europe because they were trying to uh, translate Japanese.

QUESTION: **40:00** [UNINTELLIGIBLE]

WHITEHEAD: [CHUCKLES]

QUESTION: [UNINTELLIGIBLE]

WHITEHEAD: [UNINTELLIGIBLE] more of them lived.

QUESTION: Yeah.

WHITEHEAD: Yeah.

QUESTION: That's right; that's right.

WHITEHEAD: Yeah.

QUESTION: [UNINTELLIGIBLE]

WHITEHEAD: **40:14** Oh, and I—I think a huge percentage of the—what, half of the guys in the 442nd?

QUESTION: I don't think it was that much—

WHITEHEAD: Uh, but it was substantial.

(shot 14)

QUESTION: **40:22** [UNINTELLIGIBLE] Do you have any thoughts on the [UNINTELLIGIBLE]. Tell me about martial law. To what extend did the battle over martial law become a fight? Did [UNINTELLIGIBLE].

WHITEHEAD: **40:42** Well, uh, this is what I've tried to track down; to which I have not gotten a firm answer. As you know, the ... Pearl Harbor was bombed at something like seven-fifty-five. At something like eleven-fifty-five, General Short goes into Governor Poindexter's office and demands that he declare martial law. Uh, which he does, thinking it will last for thirty days. Uh, it then lasts into 1944. Uh, when General Emmons came on December the 17th, he said that things were a bit chaotic in Hawaii, and that martial law

uh, did bring some stability. Uh, that—and—and it was probably a good thing uh, until sometime in early 1943, at which point, he said he was ready to ask Congress to lift martial law. But then he was transferred out of Hawaii, and a General Richardson was made military governor, and he preserved the martial law. **41:48** And so it was sort of after mid-1943 that you started getting all of these lawsuits, based on the fact that there was no Writ of Habeas Corpus uh, and that the courts had been um, uh, basically put out of business. And that uh, uh, if you had traffic tickets, you went to a—a provost court with just military officers. And in fact, lawyers were told not to show uh, that the military didn't really want lawyers. And so that's when you started getting the protests, particularly from Territory Attorney General Garner Anthony, even from Governor Stainback, uh, from um, Joseph Farrington, uh, uh, and the very liberal Judge Delbert Metzger, uh, that this martial law was simply unacceptable. **42:36** Um ... an—and so—and so you started getting that protest. And then they became—those people became in—in favor, except for—for Stainback, in favor of statehood. However, there were those who said that martial law was good for Hawaii. Uh, Lorrin Thurston; uh, not the two-tailed cat Lorrin, but Lorrin P. Thurston or the publisher of the Advertiser, uh, he—he became the uh, military information officer for Hawaii. He supported martial law. **43:10** Uh, of course, everyone claims Walter Dillingham supported martial law. Uh, Kamokila Campbell supported uh, martial law. Uh, the ILWU didn't even protest martial law. So ... there'd always been this undercurrent that seemingly, uh, the—the—the business community of Hawaii, except for a few people like Garner Anthony, um ... um, uh, a—accepted martial law. I—I've tried to track this one down and can't get a firm answer.

QUESTION: Well—

WHITEHEAD: **43:46** But certainly after the war, uh, uh, Farrington and Garner Anthony uh, said this was a—a—a blot on Hawaii and—and the nation and it should never be allowed to happen again. I think the Supreme Court later declared martial law unconstitutional. Um, but it was over by then.

[GENERAL CONVERSATION]

[END]